Open Access

A structured scientific solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict: the analytic hierarchy process approach

Decision Analytics20152:7

https://doi.org/10.1186/s40165-015-0017-3

Received: 6 August 2015

Accepted: 7 August 2015

Published: 18 September 2015

Abstract

While the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has raged for decades, in all of its ramifications there has never been a totally structured or scientific approach to the conflict with all of its details. The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) approaches the problem along these lines. There are a plethora of reasons why the traditional face to face negotiations have broken down over the years. This paper identifies a significant number of those impediments and indicates how the AHP can productively address them. A summary of the highlights of the AHP approach precedes how it has been applied to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. To date, the participants, significant members of both communities, have derived and agreed upon a solution that includes all the major issues, except for the refugee problem. That problem is currently being worked on, but will take an extended period because of the unique factors involved. What has been provided is an agreed upon solution to virtually all of the issues impeding past negotiations, including borders, settlements, the status of Jerusalem, the Holy Places, security and expectations of each side.

Background

Five years ago we began preliminary work to organize the difficult issues, associated with the six decade old confrontation between Israel and the Palestinians. With the support of a number of private foundations, we were able, on several occasions, to gather together in Pittsburgh participant groups of equal size, consisting of people who were interested in and knowledgeable about this conflict. Over time these initial participants were replaced by citizens of Israel and of Palestinian residency. Finally, a group of prominent Israeli and Palestinian leaders were invited to complete the cycle. This latter group has worked together for several years and has developed trust and confidence in one another that facilitated their deliberations. These serious-minded and influential participants proceeded to pursue goals to provide decision makers with quantitatively based parameters with regard to the major issues involved in the conflict. The last two meetings were held in January and in April of 2014. A summary of how AHP can be used to resolve conflicts is shown in section two of this paper. Suffice it to say that the advantages which the AHP provides over face to face negotiations are critical intellectually and substantively.

These advantages include minimizing the emotional interplay between the parties, accurately measuring the impact of intangible factors not previously considered, providing an opportunity to consider every possible issue involved, identifying all concessions that could be made by either party, no matter which party articulated them, providing an opportunity for tradeoffs between and among concessions, establishing values for each concession that create priorities expressing the importance, as accurately measured, of each factor involved, and using a hierarchical structure to establish the benefits, opportunities, costs and risks.

We began with testing how this retributive conflict (one in which both sides profess to desire a solution but were equally committed to inflicting pain on the other party) could be profitably addressed by the AHP, a mathematical theory concerned, among other factors, with the measurement of the crucial intangible criteria at the heart of this conflict. This paper can serve to illustrate how mathematics can help quantify the value of tradeoffs necessary to solve this impasse. Over the years, the AHP has been successfully applied in a wide variety of complex corporate and military decisions, involving resource allocation and prioritization of options, such as Poland’s decision not to join the Euro zone, and in some extremely sensitive political situations, such as the conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa.

We are not the only ones who believe that the Israeli Palestinian interaction is one of the most serious problems facing the world community. According to the philanthropist Jeffrey Skoll in a television interview, the five problems he’s convinced pose immediate danger to humanity are “climate change, water security, pandemics, nuclear proliferation and the Middle East conflict.” (Skoll 2013).

The analytic hierarchy process

A particular challenge for dealing with controversies as intractable as the Israeli–Palestinian conflict is how to measure the intangible factors, which may even have more influence over the outcome than the tangible factors. AHP addresses this issue through the use of pairwise comparisons, because the importance of such factors changes from one problem to another. What is needed are relative priorities developed for each problem within the context of its own diversity of factors and their influences on the actors involved and the concessions that they exchange.

The Analytic Hierarchy modeling and measurement process (AHP) is a scientific approach used to determine the relative importance of a set of activities or criteria. The novel aspect and major distinction of this approach is that it structures any complex, multi-person, multi-criteria, and multi-period problem hierarchically. Using a method for scaling the weights of the elements in each level of the hierarchy with respect to an element (e.g., a criterion or property they share) of the next higher level, a matrix of pairwise comparisons of the activities can be constructed, where the entries indicate the strength with which one element dominates another with respect to a given criterion. This scaling formulation is translated into a largest eigenvalue problem, which results in a normalized and unique vector of priority weights for each level of the hierarchy (always with respect to the criteria in the next level), which in turn results in a single composite vector of weights for the entire hierarchy. This vector measures the relative priority of all entities at the lowest level that enables the accomplishment of the highest objective of the hierarchy. These relative priority weights can provide guidelines for the allocation of resources among the entities at the lower levels of the hierarchy. When hierarchies are designed to reflect likely environmental scenarios, corporate objectives, current and proposed product/market alternatives, and various marketing strategy options, the AHP can provide a framework and methodology for the determination of a number of key corporate and marketing decisions of the firm.

The AHP focuses on dominance matrices and their corresponding measurement- the ignored areas of research compared with the more popular proximity, profile, and conjoint measurement approaches. It goes beyond the probability kind of comparative judgment approach (which of two things is more likely to happen) by relaxing the assumption of normality on the parameters; e.g., equal variance and zero covariance and restriction of the type of comparisons. The Analytic Hierarchy develops the tradeoff in the course of structuring and analyzing a series of simple reciprocal pairwise comparison matrices. The AHP is based on three major components:
  1. 1.

    AHP begins by decomposing a complex problem into a hierarchy; each level consists of a few manageable elements and each element is, in turn, decomposed into another set of elements. The process continues down to the most specific elements of the problem, typically the specific courses of action considered, which are represented at the lowest level of the hierarchy. Structuring any decision problem hierarchically is an exercise in creative thinking and is an efficient way for dealing with complexity and identifying the major components of the problem. There is no single general hierarchical structure, and one of the major attributes of the AHP is the flexibility it allows to construct a hierarchy to fit the idiosyncratic needs of the decision makers.

     
  2. 2.

    A measurement methodology is used to establish priorities among the elements within each stratum of the hierarchy. This is accomplished by asking the participants to evaluate each set of elements in a pairwise fashion with respect to each of the elements in a higher stratum. This measurement methodology provides the framework for deriving numerical priorities for ranking the alternatives of action.

     
  3. 3.

    Work for data collection and analysis constitutes the heart of the AHP. Structurally, the hierarchy is broken down into a series of paired comparison matrices, and the participants are asked to evaluate the off-diagonal relationship in one half of each matrix. Reciprocals are placed in the transposed positions, because if A is judged to be five times bigger than B, then B needs to be 1/5 as big as A.

     

Examples of how the AHP can be applied to a wide variety of problems are shown below.

Comparing five areas

Figure 1 shows five geometric areas to which we can apply the paired comparison process to test the validity of the procedure. The object is to compare them in pairs for area by eyeballing them to reproduce the overall relative weights or priorities. The absolute numbers for each pairwise comparison are shown in Table 1. Inverses are automatically entered in the transpose position. We can approximate the priorities from this matrix by normalizing each column and then taking the average of the corresponding entries in the columns. Table 1 gives the actual measurements in relative form on the right. An element on the left is compared with another at the top as to its dominance. If it is not larger than one, the top element is compared with it and the reciprocal value is used.
Table 1

Judgments, outcomes, and actual relative sizes of the five geometric shapes

Figure

Circle

Triangle

Square

Diamond

Rectangle

Priorities (Eigen-vector)

Actual relative size

Circle

1

9

2

3

5

0.462

0.471

Triangle

1/9

1

1/5

1/3

1/2

0.049

0.050

Square

1/2

5

1

3/2

3

0.245

0.234

Diamond

1/3

3

2/3

1

3/2

0.151

0.149

Rectangle

1/5

2

1/3

2/3

1

0.093

0.096

The next-to-last column in Table 1 gives the priorities derived from judgment

Fig. 1

Five figures

In making paired comparisons one assigns numbers to judgments about dominance. An element compared with itself with respect to a certain criterion is always equal to 1. Therefore, the main diagonal entries of the pairwise comparison matrix are all 1. The numbers 3, 5, 7, and 9 correspond to the verbal judgments “moderately more dominant”, “strongly more dominant”, “very strongly more dominant”, and “extremely more dominant”, with 2, 4, 6, and 8 between the previous values. Reciprocal values are automatically entered in the transpose position. We are permitted to interpolate values between the integers, if desired or use numbers from an actual ratio scale of measurement. The AHP uses the integers 1 to 9 as its Fundamental Scale of Absolute Numbers corresponding to the aforementioned verbal statements for the comparisons. This scale can be extended indefinitely by breaking things into clusters and using the largest element in one cluster as the smallest element in the next adjacent cluster, dividing all the priorities in the second cluster by this element’s value and then multiplying all values in the second cluster by the priority of that element in the first cluster so that common element has the same value in the two clusters and so on. Thus one continues to use the same 1–9 values to compare elements in new clusters.

Estimating US consumption of different drinks

A more abstract form of comparisons would involve elements with tangible properties that one must think about but cannot be perceived through the senses. See the judgments in Table 2 for estimating the Relative Consumption of Drinks. An audience of about 30 people, using consensus to arrive at each judgment, provided judgments to estimate the dominance of the consumption of drinks in the United States (which drink is consumed more in the US and how much more than another drink?). The derived vector of relative consumption and the actual vector, obtained by normalizing the consumption given in official statistical data sources, are at the bottom of the table.
Table 2

Relative consumption of drinks

Note that while in the first example, Table 1, the eye perceives different size areas, in the second example, Table 2, the mind, through wide experience and education, has a feeling for how much more frequently one drink is consumed than the other is consumed, in a pairwise comparison. Feelings are usually distinguished qualitatively and associated with numerical values. It is fortunate, in this example, that people tend to consume nearly the same amount of liquid, about a glassful, of whatever kind of drink is being consumed. Estimating the quantity of consumption is different than estimating frequency of consumption.

Buying the Best Car

How do we choose the best car from among three alternatives by considering different importance priorities for the four criteria, some intangible and some tangible: prestige, price, miles per gallon and comfort? We use the hierarchy in Fig. 2 to represent this decision.
Fig. 2

Three-level Hierarchy to Choose the Best Car

The pairwise comparisons of the criteria are given in Table 3. Criteria must always be compared to derive their priorities. We then compare the alternatives with respect to the criteria in Table 4a–d. Table 5 gives the synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives shown in the next-to-last columns of Table 4a–d, multiplied by the priorities of the criteria given in the last column of Table 3. The process of weighting, adding and normalizing priorities to one is called the distributive mode of synthesis. By contrast if one divides by the largest priority among the synthesized values, the result is called the ideal mode of synthesis. For more about synthesis modes see (Saaty 2005).
Table 3

Pairwise comparisons of the criteria as to their importance in choosing a best car

Goal

Prestige

Price

MPG

Comfort

Priorities

Prestige

1

1/4

1/3

1/2

0.099

Price

4

1

3

3/2

0.425

MPG

3

1/3

1

1/3

0.169

Comfort

2

2/3

3

1

0.308

Table 4

Comparisons of the alternatives with respect to the criteria

Prestige

Acura TL

Toyota Camry

Honda Civic

Priority Distributive

Priority Ideal

(a) Comparison of cars with respect to prestige

 Acura TL

1

8

4

0.707

1

 Toyota Camry

1/8

1

1/4

0.07

0.099

 Honda Civic

1/4

4

1

0.223

0.315

(b) Comparison of cars with respect to price

 Acura TL

1

1/4

1/9

0.063

0.085

 Toyota Camry

4

1

1/5

0.194

0.261

 Honda Civic

9

5

1

0.743

1

(c) Comparison of cars with respect to MPG

 Acura TL

1

2/3

1/3

0.182

0.333

 Toyota Camry

1 1/2

1

1/2

0.273

0.5

 Honda Civic

3

2

1

0.545

1

(d) Comparison of cars with respect to comfort

 Acura TL

1

4

7

0.705

1

 Toyota Camry

1/4

1

3

0.211

0.299

 Honda Civic

1/7

1/3

1

0.084

0.119

Table 5

Synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives

Priorities

Prestige 0.099

Price 0.425

MPG 0.169

Comfort 0.308

Synthesis of Overall Priorities

Acura TL

0.707

0.063

0.182

0.705

0.342

Toyota Camry

0.070

0.194

0.273

0.211

0.204

Honda Civic

0.223

0.743

0.545

0.084

0.454

The Honda Civic is the best car to buy because its overall priority is the largest

Psychologists have noted that there are two ways to make comparisons of alternatives. One is to compare them by considering each pair, as we have done above, and the other is to compare each alternative with an ideal one has in mind. Because, in the case of cars, we only know about the three cars we are considering, we make the best of them under each criterion the ideal for that criterion. To do that we divide the priorities under each criterion by the largest among them and that one becomes the ideal. This is shown in the last column of Table 4a–d. Using those values we have Table 6 to obtain the synthesis of the alternatives.
Table 6

Synthesis of the priorities of the alternatives using ideals to obtain the overall priorities

Priorities

Prestige 0.099

Price 0.425

MPG 0.169

Comfort 0.308

Overall priorities

Normalized

Acura TL

1.000

0.085

0.333

1.000

0.499

0.342

Toyota Camry

0.099

0.261

0.500

0.299

0.297

0.204

Honda Civic

0.315

1.000

1.000

0.119

0.661

0.454

Again, the Honda Civic is the best

Note that the overall priorities are different but the ranks and the normalized priorities are the same in Tables 5 and 6, but they need not be. Frequently people prefer to use the answer in Table 6, because that way if more cars are added each is compared only with the ideal for that criterion and the rank of the three initial alternatives stays the same.

Actually, one would not interpret tangibles to make a decision for another person and often would use the actual measurements for those tangibles as indicators for their relative worth or importance. Thus, if instead of using judgments for the price, we use the ratio of the actual prices as shown in Table 7 (in fact, we use the inverses of these ratios because lower prices should have higher priorities) and then compute the priorities, we would obtain the same answer as simply normalizing the prices. In using direct data one must be careful to invert the priorities obtained if higher numbers mean less desirable.
Table 7

Priorities of cars with respect to price using actual dollar values

Price in Dollars

Average Prices

Average Prices Used as Priorities

Invert Priorities

Final Priorities (normalized)

Ideal Priorities

Acura TL

32,500

0.425

1/0.425

0.247

0.554

Toyota Camry

26,000

0.340

1/0.340

0.308

0.692

Honda Civic

18,000

0.235

1/0.235

0.445

1.000

Sum

76,500

1

0.00012479

1

 
With the ratio of the actual prices being used for the vector of priorities, Table 8 gives the overall priorities of the alternatives in the ideal mode.
Table 8

Ideal synthesis to obtain the priorities of the cars

Priorities

Prestige 0.099

Price 0.425

MPG 0.169

Comfort 0.308

Overall Priorities

Normalized to One

Acura TL

1.000

0.554

0.333

1.000

0.698

0.379

Toyota Camry

0.099

0.692

0.500

0.299

0.480

0.261

Honda Civic

0.315

1.000

1.000

0.119

0.661

0.359

In this case the Acura is slightly better than the Honda, but not by very much. As to be expected, the priorities in Table 8 are different from those in Table 6, obtained from judgments.

We note that in making comparisons, the value of any element depends on the value of what it is compared with. It is not like assigning it a number from a scale of measurement with an arbitrary unit. This led to a criticism about rank reversal when new alternatives are added or old ones deleted by those who, in single but nor multiple criteria rankings, were only used to assigning elements one at a time numbers from a scale. In multicriteria decisions, for example, criteria need to always be compared because one cannot meaningfully assign importance to them, even if some people try doing it, and scales are then developed for each criterion separately. The answer to rank preservation or reversal does not lie in a mathematical theorem that says that rank must always be preserved. There are numerous examples that show that rank reversals can and should occur in practice (Saaty 2005).

To preserve rank, the ratings mode was developed by constructing through pairwise comparisons a rating scale for each criterion. These rating scales opened the door for using numerical data in normalized (by dividing each value by the sum of all the values) form, and also using mathematical functions as desired. Alternatives are then rated independently, one at a time, by selecting the appropriate rating for it on each criterion. By pre-evaluating ranges of data through expert judgment, it makes it possible to automate the process of evaluating data. Thus, one uses comparisons or ratings, depending on the circumstances. When the criteria are changeable, as in selecting the best CEO for a company, one uses comparisons and its corresponding method of synthesis, called the distributive mode. When the criteria are standardized, as in the admission of students to a university, evaluating projects or military officers, one uses ratings with its ideal mode, even when the ideal may change because of adding new alternatives never previously encountered or conceived. Note: This is the method we use below to derive the priorities of the concessions with respect to benefits, costs, perceived benefits and costs in all the tables that follow.

Retributive conflicts and the AHP

There are two types of conflict resolution. We call the first kind constructive. It is what is conventionally treated in the so-called rational approach to conflict resolution. Each party identifies its demands, and it is assumed that a way can be found to satisfy both parties demands fairly. Fairly here means that each party forms a ratio of its benefits to those of the opponent and attempts to satisfy its own needs, at least as much as its perceived evaluation of the opponent’s benefits, because the utilities or values may be interpreted differently by the two sides. The tug of war by each side can end up in equalizing the ratio to unity. That is why it is inadvisable for either party to give up too early.

In this case, negotiations begin with each party setting down what it expects to get. The negotiations may either result in getting that much, or changing the outcome so that both sides receive more, or often, less than their expectations because there is not enough to go around. The parties begin by offering some concessions from a larger set of concessions, which they maintain secretly. An offer is evaluated in terms of the benefits of the counter-offer received and may be withdrawn, if not reciprocated adequately.

The second kind of conflict is retributive with one or both parties harboring ill will towards each other. The idea is particularly relevant in long drawn-out conflicts, which in the end fester and create almost ineradicable resentments. Here a party may be willing to give up much of its demands, if misfortune can be brought to its opponent through some means, including justice as dispensed by the court system. Should the enemy die, they may forgive and forget, or sometimes they may be resentful because they have not extracted their pound of flesh.

Thus, in negotiations, each party not only calculates the incremental benefits it gets, but also the costs to its opponent. The more of either, the greater is the gain. Gain is the product of the benefits to the party and the costs (whose aim may also be long-run benefits) to the opponent. Each side must calculate what it estimates to be the opponent’s gain as a product of benefits to the opponent and costs to itself and make sure that the ratio of its gain to the opponent’s gain, which it considers as a loss, is greater than unity or not less than what the opponent is perceived to get. Thus, each party is concerned with maximizing its gains via its benefits and the costs to the opponent, and also by negotiating to increase this gain and decrease its loss (which is a gain to the opponent). When several concessions are considered simultaneously, sums of the products of benefits and costs must be taken. We have the following ratios for the two parties A and B:
$$ \begin{aligned} &{\text{ (as perceived by A)}}\\ &A{\text{'s ratio }}\frac{\text{gain to A}}{{A {\text{'s perception of gain to B}}}} = \frac{{\sum {\text{A's benefits}} \times {\text {B's costs}} }}{{\sum {\text{B's benefits}} \times {\text {A's costs}} }} = \frac{\text{gain to A}}{\text{loss to A}} \end{aligned} $$
where ∑ is the sum taken over all concessions by B in the numerator and by A in the denominator. A’s perceived ratio for B is the reciprocal of the above.
$$\begin{aligned} &{\text{ (as perceived by B)}}\\ &B{\text{'s ratio }}\frac{\text{gain to B}}{{B {\text{'s perception of gain to A}}}} = \frac{{\sum {\text{B's benefits}} \times {\text {A's costs}} }}{{\sum {\text{A's benefits}} \times {\text {B's costs}} }} = \frac{\text{gain to B}}{\text{loss to B}} \end{aligned}$$
where Σ is the sum taken over all concessions by A in the numerator and by B in the denominator. A’s perceived ratio for A is the reciprocal of the above. If both A and B’s perceive benefits and costs in the same way, these ratios would be reciprocals of each other. This almost never happens, however.

Obviously, each party would like its ratio to be as high as possible. If A`s ratio for some package is less than 1, then A will perceive B`s ratio as being greater than 1 and will feel that it has not been treated fairly. The aim must be to find single concessions and groups of concessions where each party perceives its own ratio to be greater than 1. This requires skilled mediation.

As just explained, each party calculates its gain as the product of its benefits and its perceived value of the costs to the opponent and its loss as the product of its costs and its perceived value of the benefits to the opponent. Thus, in a conflict resolution scenario, wherein each party has a set of concessions to make, party A, for example, calculates the benefits it will accrue from B’s concessions to A, and its perception of the costs to B for these concessions.

Thus, there will ordinarily be four such calculations for each party and many more for a mediator, for example, who would use the judgments the parties give him and would compare them with his own perceptions; the mediator would then attempt to alter their perceptions or convince them that certain concessions are more to their advantage and advise them of the order in which such concessions should be made.

If each of the ratios is perceived by the corresponding party to be less than unity, the problem is to alter these perceptions, so that both parties think that they are equally treated. By looking at their own ratio and the opponent’s ratio as perceived by them, which is the reciprocal of their ratio, the parties will tend to argue as follows: “Look what I am giving up. He gets high benefits and the costs to me are very high. He should be happy. On the other hand, look at what he is offering me. My benefits are low and the costs to him are very low. It is not a fair trade. He is not hurting enough in what he is offering me.”

Note that constructive conflict resolution is a special case of retributive conflict resolution whereby the costs to the opponent are assigned a unit value. Each party assumes that the opponent is paying the full cost and concentrates on maximizing its own benefits. He cannot assign any additional costs to the opponent.

The chief purpose of AHP is to provide decision makers with objective, numerical parameters regarding specific core issues. From such a valuation model, decision makers have access to a rationally based model/tool for addressing and resolving specific, complex issues.

The primary benefit of the AHP as a tool for Middle East peace negotiators, whether used internally or together between the parties, is to reduce uncertainties—between and among the parties—on the relative value of core issues as negotiators address the “trade-off/exchange” component of negotiations. The information produced by this tool enhances rationally-based decision-making, helps reduce emotion in negotiations, and assesses more accurately the relative value that each group attaches to a particular issue.

The trade-off model is predicated upon development and application of a process that reflects both in-depth understanding of values attached by the respective parties (or sub-parties) to an issue, and the importance of that issue in relation to other issues, of lesser, similar, or greater value. Of equal importance is determining the value the other side attaches to that issue and the value both sides attach within the context of a trade-off or trade-offs.

The process requires assigning numerical values that measure the respective importance of each issue for the parties involved; it is that assessment/assignment that enables rationally based decision-making in the context of potential trade-offs. AHP focuses on articulation and application of self-interest in a paradigm emphasizing trade-offs, whereby both sides seek to “expand the pie”—and avoid zero-sum calculations that emphasize maximization of benefits for one side, to the detriment of the other side.

The list of eight basic ideas behind the trade-offs is as follows:
  1. 1.
    Each party identifies a set of concessions (trade-offs). For example Tables 9 and 10 reflect these basic ideas in the case of the Israeli–Palestinian controversy.
    Table 9

    Possible Israeli concessions

    Israelis’ concessions

    Description

    1

    Abandon the Idea of a Jewish State

    2

    Accept Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its outlets

    3

    Accept the historical responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem

    4

    Accept the Palestinian refugee rights to return

    5

    Accept to abide by the status quo in the holy places in Jerusalem

    6

    Accept to abolish the law of return

    7

    Accept to respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage between the two areas

    8

    Accept East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian State

    9

    Accept Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967

    10

    Allow all parties to have equal access to and control of religious sites and holy places

    11

    Allow the sharing of all natural resources between Palestinians and Israelis

    12

    Comply with all applicable UN Resolutions

    13

    Evacuate settlers of Jewish settlements on land claimed by the Palestinians with or without compensation

    14

    Release all political prisoners including those who are Israeli citizens

    15

    Share Jerusalem as two capitals of two states

    16

    Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner

    17

    Stop incitement by the religious and national education and religious leaders in Israel against Muslims and Arabs

    Table 10

    Possible Palestinian concessions

    Palestinians’ concessions

    Description

    1

    Accept mutually agreed upon land swap

    2

    Accept settlers under Palestinian sovereignty as residents

    3

    Accept the temporary presence of a multinational military monitoring system in Jordan Valley

    4

    Accept a Two-State solution

    5

    Accept a Two-State solution which includes a non-contiguous state

    6

    Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish State

    7

    Acknowledge Israel’s existence as an independent state

    8

    Agree to compromise to the demand of the right of return

    9

    Agreeing with Palestinian demilitarized state

    10

    Preserve the status quo in the Holy places of Jerusalem

    11

    Allow Israel to use Palestinian airspace

    12

    Declare against Iranian nuclear development

    13

    Denounce and reign in violence

    14

    Denounce Iranian pursuit of nuclear arms and support Israelis effort to remove the threat

    15

    Lobby Arab states to allow both Israelis and Palestinians to have the right to return to their land of origin

    16

    Make compromises on the status of Jerusalem

    17

    Palestinians must guarantee that any agreement reached with Israel will be accepted and supported by the majority of the Palestinian people, both in Gaza and the West Bank

    18

    Refrain and work against any anti-Israel sentiments in Palestinian schools

    19

    Seek assistance for a legitimate settlement of refugees

    20

    Sharing of natural resources

    21

    Work cooperatively and in active engagement w/Israel

     
  2. 2.
    Each trade-off that a party gives away yields for that party a set of costs (not necessarily monetary) and a perceived set of benefits for the party receiving it (Table 11).
    Table 11

    Israeli and Palestinian costs and perceived benefits

     

    Priorities

    Israeli costs from its concessions

     Integrity and unity of Israeli society post-agreement

    0.0659

     Security

    0.1831

     Strengthening the alliance with the United States

    0.0457

     Make Israel more attractive to Jewish diaspora and Israelis citizens

    0.0322

     End of claims and end of conflict

    0.2093

     Legitimization of the State of Israel

    0.0778

     Stop being occupiers

    0.0477

     Peace, economy and stability in region

    0.086

     Maintain the Jewish majority of Israel alongside with the Arab minority

    0.2249

     Weakening the radical forces in the Middle East headed by Iran

    0.0274

    Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

     Freedom, dignity and feeling of equality

    0.1449

     Independent state

    0.2145

     Evacuation of the settlers in the settlements

    0.0661

     International recognition and permanent borders

    0.0368

     Maximization of the area (land)

    0.0816

     Economic stability and prosperity

    0.0219

     East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine

    0.1361

     Solve the Refugee problem

    0.2128

     Control of the Muslim holy places

    0.0853

    Palestinian costs from its concessions

     Conflict between Palestinian diaspora and the internal leadership

    0.0948

     Giving up the claim over historic Palestine occupied in 1948 and known later as the State of Israel

    0.2055

     Partial loss/depletion of natural resources by sharing them with Israel

    0.1257

     Loss of military capability to defend the State of Palestine

    0.0575

     Territorial loss as a result of unfair land swap

    0.2173

     Accommodation and rehabilitation of Palestinian refugees not allowed to return to Israel

    0.1192

     Restrictions on national sovereignty by accepting demilitarization and multinational monitoring

    0.1013

     Loss of property rights

    0.0395

     Dislocation and fragmentation of Palestinian social fabric

    0.0392

    Palestinian perception of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

     Gaining legitimacy of the Palestinian and Arab and Muslim world

    0.1111

     Integration in the Middle East with normal relations with its neighbors and Arab World

    0.0658

     End of claims by the Palestinians

    0.2556

     Obtaining security by acceptance and recognition of the Palestinian and Arab and Muslim world

    0.108

     Sharing the Palestinians with their own natural resources

    0.0215

     Obtaining territorial gains

    0.1184

     Economic relations and new markets including tourism with neighboring Arab and Islamic countries

    0.0999

     Reduction of military expenditures enabling national development

    0.0239

     Regional cooperation against external threats

    0.0333

     Acknowledgement of Israeli control over the Wailing Wall and the Jewish Quarter in the Old City of Jerusalem

    0.1626

     
  3. 3.
    Each trade-off that a party receives generates a set of benefits and a perceived set of losses for the party giving it away (Table 12).
    Table 12

    Israeli and Palestinian benefits and perceived costs

     

    Priorities

    Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

     Integrity and unity of Israeli society post agreement

    0.0753

     Security

    0.1636

     Strengthening the alliance with the United States

    0.0477

     Make Israel more attractive to Jewish diaspora and Israelis citizens

    0.0397

     End of claims

    0.2216

     Legitimization of the State of Israel

    0.0654

     Stop being occupiers

    0.0529

     Peace, prosperity and stability in region

    0.0959

     Maintain the Jewish majority of Israel alongside with the Arab minority

    0.1899

     Weakening the radical forces in the Middle East headed by Iran

    0.0479

    Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

     Giving up on the Idea of a Greater Palestine

    0.088

     Remainder of part of the Settlement Community

    0.0964

     Loss of ‘victim’ status

    0.0288

     Loss of land (67 Border)/swap

    0.15

     Loss of International financial support

    0.0252

     Partial control of East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine

    0.1735

     Partial solution refuge problem

    0.3101

     Partial control of the Muslim holy places

    0.128

    Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

     Permanent borders

    0.2095

     Sovereign Palestinian State

    0.2054

     Share of water and other resources

    0.0181

     Resolution of the refugee problem

    0.0654

     Shared control of Jerusalem and holy places

    0.0613

     International guarantees and assurances to protect Palestine State security and integrity

    0.0403

     Evacuation of the Israeli settlements

    0.0415

     Having full control over air space, maritime, borders and outlets

    0.1086

     Release of political prisoners including those who are Israeli citizens

    0.0186

     Respect the integrity of West Bank and Gaza

    0.0571

     Stop incitement and raging hatred

    0.0087

     East Jerusalem as the capital of the State of Palestine

    0.1654

    Palestinian perception of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

     Changing of Zionist narrative

    0.4541

     Property restitution and compensation

    0.0689

     Settlements evacuation

    0.2723

     Rehabilitating evacuated settlers from the Palestinian territories

    0.2047

     
  4. 4.

    The benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs are prioritized, using the AHP. (see the Priorities column in Tables 11 and 12).

     
  1. 5.
    The trade-offs are evaluated according to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits, and perceived costs (Table 13).
    Table 13

    Evaluation of Trade-offs

    Concessions

    Israelis’ Costs (2)

    Israelis’ Perception of Palestinians’ Benefits (3)

    Israelis’ Total Loss (2)*(3)*1000

    Palestinians’ Benefits (5)

    Palestinians’ Perception of Israelis Costs (6)

    Palestinians’ Total Gain (5)*(6)*1000

    Israelis

     1

    1

    1

    1000

    0.8875

    0.9683

    859.43

     2

    0.6445

    0.7637

    492.18

    0.9892

    0.9717

    961.20

     3

    0.9051

    0.2705

    244.88

    0.9565

    0.7835

    749.44

     4

    0.9470

    0.8253

    781.53

    0.8884

    0.9515

    845.25

     5

    0.1961

    0.5405

    106.01

    0.8008

    0.7583

    607.29

     6

    0.8824

    0.4280

    377.70

    0.5455

    0.7410

    404.22

     7

    0.1984

    0.5149

    102.15

    0.9838

    0.9054

    890.73

     8

    0.8299

    0.8068

    669.54

    1

    0.9692

    969.17

     9

    0.0545

    0.8205

    44.75

    0.9829

    0.9080

    892.42

     10

    0.1006

    0.5323

    53.55

    0.8053

    0.5459

    439.65

     11

    0.1120

    0.2853

    31.96

    0.6691

    0.5260

    351.93

     12

    0.8596

    0.9571

    822.76

    0.9847

    0.9075

    893.59

     13

    0.3593

    0.8915

    320.31

    0.9310

    1

    930.98

     14

    0.5178

    0.4781

    247.56

    0.7528

    0.6508

    489.95

     15

    0.1633

    0.6027

    98.42

    0.8472

    0.7334

    621.31

     16

    0.1806

    0.7329

    132.34

    0.8884

    0.9174

    815.03

     17

    0.0741

    0.1110

    8.23

    0.4134

    0.4991

    206.29

    Concessions

    Palestinians’ Costs (2)

    Palestinians’ Perception of Israelis’ Benefits (3)

    Palestinians’ Total Loss (2)*(3)*1000

    Israelis’ Benefits (5)

    Israelis’ Perception of Palestinians’ Costs (6)

    Israelis’ Total Gain (5)*(6)*1000

    Palestinians

     1

    0.9349

    0.2000

    186.95

    0.9233

    0.6353

    586.55

     2

    0.8877

    0.2000

    177.51

    0.2333

    0.4743

    110.66

     3

    0.8101

    0.2000

    161.99

    0.7033

    0.1106

    77.80

     4

    0.8518

    0.8947

    762.13

    0.9944

    0.1660

    165.08

     5

    0.8438

    0.2000

    168.74

    0.7543

    0.3011

    227.15

     6

    0.9035

    0.9345

    844.30

    0.8741

    1

    874.13

     7 

    0.8635

    0.2000

    172.67

    0.8055

    0.6196

    499.09

     8

    0.9298

    0.9572

    889.98

    1

    0.8557

    855.72

     9

    0.8718

    0.2000

    174.33

    0.5968

    0.1353

    80.74

     10

    0.7691

    0.2331

    179.27

    0.7031

    0.3355

    235.85

     11

    0.8957

    0.2000

    179.12

    0.6592

    0.1096

    72.28

     12

    0.5522

    0.2000

    110.42

    0.3968

    0.0348

    13.81

     13

    0.6878

    0.2000

    137.54

    0.6153

    0.1119

    68.87

     14

    0.5098

    0.2000

    101.95

    0.4967

    0.0443

    22.00

     15 

    0.8119

    0.2000

    162.35

    0.2009

    0.3663

    73.61

    16

    1

    1

    1000.00

    0.9251

    0.6221

    575.49

     17

    0.5796

    0.2000

    115.90

    0.8541

    0.5253

    448.69

     18

    0.7352

    0.2000

    147.01

    0.7583

    0.1871

    141.88

     19

    0.8621

    0.3908

    336.96

    0.9572

    0.8724

    835.03

     20

    0.8158

    0.2000

    163.14

    0.4069

    0.0544

    22.14

     21

    0.2000

    0.2000

    39.99

    0.7613

    0.1858

    141.44

     
  2. 6.

    The trade-offs of the parties are paired to decide which pairs are acceptable. Acceptable means that both parties benefit from the trade-off and that they receive more than they lose from the trade-off they give away. Acceptability of a pair of trade-offs is implemented using a gain-loss ratio. Gain-loss ratios are not symmetric for the parties.

     
  3. 7.

    Acceptable pairs of trade-offs are identified with the additional condition that the gain-loss ratio of a pair of concessions is as close as possible for the parties (i.e., within a small percentage of each other). Total equality in the tradeoffs is highly unlikely because of computational imprecision.

     
  4. 8.
    If the gain-loss ratios for all the acceptable pairs of trade-offs are as close as possible, the totality of the pairs of trade-offs should be as close as possible, and the agreement should be balanced (Fig. 3).
    Fig. 3

    A balanced agreement. IR Israeli ratios, PR Palestinian ratios

     

All the critical issues in the conflict: the declaration of the Pittsburgh principles

The data developed above in “Retributive conflicts and the AHP” provided a veritable trove of practical information not previously available to the participants, but based on their own judgments they were now able to understand their own and their protagonists priorities on a wide variety of issues. It became apparent as to which issue on either side had the highest priority for each side, directly asking the question as to what was most important and least important would not have yielded an accurate statement of the trues priorities. The AHP approach addresses such questions in an oblique manner and creates a reality that is far more accurate than trying to achieve an accurate statement by either party. The pairwise comparison approach yielded results which gives each party the kind of understanding of the true problem that can be rarely achieved in face to face negotiations.

Armed with this data, the participants began to consider where agreement might be reached on certain general principles. It became clear that the general principles would be helpful in considering general issues. With full recognition that the devil is in the details, the participants spent considerable time in honing a set of principles that could be agreed upon, word by word, based on knowledge that the AHP approach could provide.

After long hours of interaction, the following general principles, dubbed the Pittsburgh Principles were developed. While it would be presumptuous to suggest that these principles would create a solution to the controversy, participants on both sides felt that the statement of the principles provided a great deal that had eluded the face to face negotiators. All involved understood that the most difficult task of implementing the general principles remained to be addressed. The general principles agreed upon were as follows:
  1. 1.

    A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with mutually agreed upon land swaps.

     
  2. 2.

    Israel must respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage between the two areas, and the Palestinian State must guarantee that any agreement reached with Israel will be accepted and supported by the majority of the Palestinian people both in Gaza and the West Bank.

     
  3. 3.

    East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian State. The parties will maintain the status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.

     
  4. 4.

    Acknowledge Israel’s existence as a Jewish State, without jeopardizing the rights of its minority Israeli citizens.

     
  5. 5.

    Evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Palestinian territories that are not included in the land swap.

     
  6. 6.

    Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its outlets, and deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring system in the Jordan Valley.

     
  7. 7.

    Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner.

     
  8. 8.

    Limited arms of the Palestinian state and international guarantees from the international community against aggression from other parties.

     
  9. 9.

    Agreed upon international monitoring mechanism and agreed upon binding international arbitration mechanisms.

     
  10. 10.

    The full implementation of these principles concludes end of the conflict and claims of the two parties.

     

Implementation steps

In recent months the participants have focused exclusively on developing an implementation plan for each of the Pittsburgh Principles. The outcome of these discussions, using AHP methodology, resulted in a detailed agreement reflecting each of the Pittsburgh Principles, except for #7 which reads “solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner”. This Principle was addressed in an initial implementation mode, but was so complex that we achieved only a few agreed upon details. Several more meetings are planned to complete a fully implementable implementation plan for this principle. Nevertheless, what has been agreed upon so far addresses some of the relevant issues.

While even a detailed implementation plan will require further discussion between the parties, the participants in our study, who are significant members of the Israeli and Palestinian communities, believe that the level of detail presented below will facilitate agreement on these issues, even if some modifications are required.

Principle 1 A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with mutually agreed upon land swaps.

The first principle proved to be a difficult statement to implement because it essentially sought to determine the borders of the two entities, a very controversial issue. The participants struggled with an implementation statement, but then decided that a small subgroup would meet separately to try and agree upon the principles for land swaps.

In a meeting in October of 2013 a subcommittee of the participants met at an undisclosed location to draft implementation principles for a land swap. The entire participant group rewrote this material in the format given below.

Land swap principles

October 2013.

(Revised January 2014).

General guidelines

  • A Two-State solution on the borders of the 4th of June 1967, with minimal, mutually agreed upon land swap of the same size and of equal value for both sides.

  • Territorial contiguity of both states is a principle of importance for both sides.

  • Land swap between the State of Israel and the State of Palestine in a manner beneficial to both sides.

  • Systematic and time limited process for implementing land swap.

  • No swap of land for money.

  • No empty Palestinian land or land populated by Palestinians, for swap.

  • Tradeoff issues that go beyond land for land could be discussed and should be mutually agreed upon.

  • Maximum number of Israeli citizens and minimum Palestinian land to be annexed with proximity to the 1967 line.

  • East Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank.

  • Jewish neighborhoods built in East Jerusalem after 1967 will be part of the land swap.

  • The passage between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank will be part of the land swap.

Jerusalem

Overall arching values relevant to Jerusalem.
  • One city two capitals.

  • The capital of the State of Palestine will be in East Jerusalem.

  • Contiguity of neighborhoods for both sides (minimize isolation of communities).

  • Mutually agreed arrangement for the Old City.

  • Both sides will work towards agreed upon procedures and arrangements to enable the citizens of the two countries to have access to the city of Jerusalem.

  • No Israeli population evacuation with the option of staying under Palestinian sovereignty as individual residents respecting and abiding by Palestinian laws.

  • Palestinians living in Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem will not be evacuated and will live under Israeli sovereignty.

  • Develop road links wherever necessary.

West Bank

  • Israel is responsible to evacuate the settlers who refuse to comply with the agreement.

  • The State of Palestine will take full responsibility for the safety of Israeli citizens who choose to stay under Palestinian sovereignty as residents on equal footing with its own citizens.

  • The State of Israel will take full responsibility for the safety of Palestinian citizens who choose to stay under Israel sovereignty as residents on equal footing with its own citizens.

  • Israel will refrain from any settlement activities in the West Bank or East Jerusalem during the implementation of the agreement.

Today there are 144 Israeli settlements in the West Bank (see Table 14) and an unknown number of outposts. Israel wants to annex 43 of the settlements in exchange for land in other parts of Israel (see Table 15). The other settlements will have to be disposed of appropriately. These settlements contain about 74.58 % of the population in the settlements, and cover an area of approximately 3.1 % of the area of the West Bank or 182 sq. km. The maps in Figs. 4 and 5 show the settlements in Table 10 (marked in yellow) to be annexed by Israel in this solution.
Table 14

List of Settlements in the West Bank

 

Israeli settlements

Name

Population 2012

Builtup area (Dunums)

Character

Est.

Fence [7]

Council

Subarea or bloc

3

Adora

278

159

Secular

1984

E

Har Hebron

West

4

Alei Zahav

462

255

Secular

1982

W

Shomron

Western S.

5

Alfei Menashe

7574

1085

Secular

1983

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

6

Alon Shvut

3066

643

Religious

1970

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

7

Almog

178

111

Secular

1977

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

8

Almon

1132

376

Secular

1982

W

Binyamin

Adumim

9

Arg aman

132

165

Secular

1968

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

10

Ariel

18176

2479

Mixed

1978

W

Shomron

Western S. [9]

11

Asfar (Metzad)

469

178

Orthodox

1983

E

Gush Etzion

Judean Mtns

12

Ateret

775

235

Religious

1981

E

Mateh Binyamin

Western B.

13

Avnat

119

  

1983

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

14

Avnei Hefetz

1614

493

Religious

1990

E

Shomron

Western S.

15

Barkan

1502

349

Secular

1981

W

Shomron

Western S.

16

Bat Ayin

1117

239

Religious

1989

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

17

Beit Aryeh

4166

960

Secular

1981

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

18

Beit El

5897

944

Religious

1977

E

Mateh Binyamin

[8] Ramallah

19

Beit HaArava

119

280

Secular

1980

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

20

Beit Horon

1149

181

Mixed

1977

W

Mateh Binyamin

Giv’on

21

Beit Yatir (Mezadot Yehuda)

399

170

Religious

1983

W

Har Hebron

South

22

Beitar Illit

42,467

1773

Orthodox

1985

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion [9]

23

Beka’ot

175

120

Secular

1972

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

24

Carmei Tzur

872

160

Religious

1984

E

Gush Etzion

Etzion

25

Carmel

378

177

Religious

1981

E

Har Hebron

South

26

Dolev

1306

355

Religious

1983

E

Mateh Binyamin

Western B.

27

East Talpiot

13,984

1195

Secular

1967

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

28

Efrat(a)

7812

1090

Religious

1980

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion [8]

29

El’azar

2302

256

Religious

1975

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

30

Eli

3521

776

Mixed

1984

E

Shomron

Eli

31

Elkana

3860

758

Religious

1977

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

32

Elon Moreh

1632

419

Religious

1979

E

Shomron

Nablus

33

Immanuel

3660

328

Orthodox

1983

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

34

Einav

662

158

Religious

1981

E

Shomron

Enav

35

Eshkolot

510

133

Secular

1982

W

Har Hebron

South

36

Etz Efraim

864

184

Mixed

1985

W

Shomron

Western S.

37

French Hill (Giv’at Shapira)

8660

2018

Secular

1969

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

38

Ganim

   

1983

E

Shomron

Northern S.

39

Geva Binyamin (Adam)

4674

728

Secular

1984

E

Mateh Binyamin

Ramallah

40

Gilual, Bik’at HaYarden

167

570

Secular

1970

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

41

Gilo

29,559

2859

Secular

1973

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

42

Gitit

308

113

Secular

1973

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

43

Giv’at Hamivtar

2944

  

1970

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

44

Giv’at Ze’ev

13,466

1063

Secular

1983

W

Mateh Binyamin

[8] Giv’on

45

Giv’on Hadasha

1131

226

Secular

1980

W

Mateh Binyamin

Giv’on

46

Hagai

541

233

Religious

1984

E

Har Hebron

Hebron

47

Hallamish

1144

450

Religious

1977

E

Mateh Binyamin

Western B.

48

Hamra

110

133

Secular

1971

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

49

Har Adar (Giv’at Ha Radar)

3701

969

Secular

1986

W

Mateh Binyamin

[8] Giv’on

50

Har Brakha

1769

258

 

1983

E

Shomron

Nablus

51

Har Gilo

952

127

Secular

1972

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

52

Har Homa, Givat Hamatos

9811

2523/310

Religious

1997

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

53

Hashmonaim

2573

835

Religious-Orthodox

1985

W

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

54

Hebron

850

  

1980

E

Har Hebron

Hebron [11]

55

Hemdat (Nahal)

186

82

N/A

1980

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

56

Hermesh

189

134

Secular

1982

E

Shomron

Rehan

57

Hinanit

945

280

Mixed

1981

W

Shomron

Rehan

58

Homesh

0

157

Secular

1980

E

Shomron

Northern S.

59

Itamar

1024

253

Religious

1984

E

Shomron

Nablus

60

Kadim

0

148

Secular

1983

E

Shomron

Northern S.

61

Kalia

360

537

Secular

1968

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

62

Karnei Shomron

6570

1351

Mixed

1978

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

63

Kedar

1246

251

Secular

1985

W

Gush Etzion

Adumim

64

Kedumim

4124

1003

Mixed

1977

W

Shomron

Kedumim [8]

65

Kfar Adumim

3527

921

Mixed

1979

W

Mateh Binyamin

Adumim

66

Kfar Etzion

975

445

Religious

1967

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

67

Kfar Tapuach

1207

156

Religious

1978

E

Shomron

Western S.

68

Kiryat Arba

7593

882

Mixed

1972

E

Har Hebron

Hebron [8]

69

Kiryat Netafim

749

162

Religious

1983

W

Shomron

Western S.

70

Kokhav HaShahar

1548

586

Religious

1977

V

Mateh Binyamin

Jordan

71

Kokhav Ya’akov (Abir Ya’akov)

6476

756

Religious

1985

E

Mateh Binyamin

Ramallah

72

Lapid

2543

386

Secular

1996

W

Hevel Modi’in

Modi’in

73

Ma’ale Adumim

36,862

3589

Mixed

1975

W

Gush Etzion [9]

Adumim

74

Ma’ale Amos

350

155

Orthodox

1981

E

Gush Etzion

Judean Mtns

75

Ma’ale Efraim

332

521

Secular

1970

V

Bik’at HaYarden [8]

Jordan Valley

76

Ma’ale Levona

1119

251

Religious

1983

E

Mateh Binyamin

Eli

77

Ma’ale Mikhmas

724

383

Religious

1981

V

Mateh Binyamin

 

78

Ma’ale Shomron

1251

216

Mixed

1980

W

Shomron

Western S.

79

Ma’alot Dafna

2720

380

Secular

1972

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

80

Ma’on

454

173

Religious

1981

E

Har Hebron

South

81

Maskiot

132

32

 

1986

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

82

Massu’a

153

160

Secular

1970

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

83

Matityahu

568

195

Religious

1981

W

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

84

Mehola

429

190

N/A

1968

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

85

Mekhora

112

132

Secular

1973

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

86

Menora

2644

453

Secular

1998

W

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

87

Mevo Dotan

276

122

Secular

1978

E

Shomron

Rehan

88

Mevo Horon

2147

519

Religious

1970

W

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

89

Migdal Oz

512

576

Religious

1977

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

90

Migdalim

147

130

Secular

1983

E

Shomron

Western S.

91

Mishor Adumim

 

1550

    

Adumim

92

Mitzpe Shalem

173

151

Secular

1971

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

93

Mitzne Yericho

2115

564

Religious

1978

V

Mateh Binyamin

Jordan

94

Modi’in Illit

55,494

1606

Orthodox

1996

W

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in [8]

95

Na’ale

1203

349

Secular

1988

E

Mateh Binyamin

 

96

Nahliel

496

114

Orthodox

1984

E

Mateh Binyamin

Western B.

97

Negohot

258

90

Religious

1999

E

Har Hebron

West

98

Nativ HaGdud

162

1042

Secular

1976

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

99

Neve Daniel

2058

263

Religious

1982

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

100

Neve Yaakov

19,703

1759

Secular

1972

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

101

Nili

968

282

Secular

1981

E

Mateh Binyamin

 

102

Niran

69

302

Secular

1977

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

103

Nofim

437

248

Secular

1987

W

Shomron

Western S.

104

Nokdim

1561

440

Mixed

1982

E

Gush Etzion

Judean Mtns

105

Na’omi

98

280

Secular

1982

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

106

Ofarim

n/a

351

Secular

1989

W

Mateh Binyamin

 

107

Ofra

3489

1012

Religious

1975

E

Mateh Binyamin

Ramallah

108

Old City Jewish Quarter

3105

156

Orthodox

  

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

109

Oranit

7195

878

Mixed

1985

W

Shomron

Western S. [8]

110

Otniel

927

291

Religious

1983

E

Har Hebron

South

111

Peduel

1315

171

Religious

1984

W

Shomron

Western S.

112

Ma’ale Hever (Peneh Hever)

398

110

Religious

1982

E

Mateh Binyamin

Ramallah

113

Peza’el

216

319

Secular

1975

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

114

Pisgat Ze’ev

44,512

5467

Secular

1985

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

115

Psagot

1728

234

Religious

1981

E

Har Hebron

Hebron

116

Ramat Eshkol

3573

682

Secular

1970

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

117

Ramat Shlomo

14,554

741

Orthodox

1995

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

118

Ramot Alon

41,410

2558

Orthodox

1974

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

119

Rehan

174

90

Secular

1977

W

Shomron

Rehan

120

Revava

1545

160

Religious

1991

W

Shomron

Western S.

121

Rimonim

572

314

Secular

1977

V

Mateh Binyamin

Jordan

122

Ro’i

154

134

Secular

1976

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

123

Rosh Tzurim

855

320

Religious

1969

W

Gush Etzion

Etzion

124

Sanhedria Murhevet

4094

378

 

1970

W

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

125

Sa-Nur

0

44

Secular

1982

E

Shomron

Northern S.

126

Sal’it

542

256

Secular

1977

W

Shomron

Enav

127

Sha’are Tikva

5100

915

Mixed

1983

W

Shomron

Western S.

128

Shadmot Mehola

512

159

N/A

1979

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

129

Shaked

724

206

Secular

1981

W

Shomron

Rehan

130

Shani

430

30

Secular

1989

W

Har Hebron

South

131

Shavei Shomron

745

272

Religious

1977

E

Shomron

Western S.

132

Shilo

2706

482

Religious

1979

E

Mateh Binyamin

Eli

133

Shim’a

375

212

Secular

1985

E

Har Hebron

South

134

Shvut Rachel

400

  

1991

E

Mateh Binyamin

Eli

135

Susiya

950

352

Religious

1983

E

Har Hebron

South

136

Talmon

3202

1135

Religious

1989

E

Mateh Binyamin

Western B.

137

Tekoa

2518

402

Mixed

1977

E

Gush Etzion

Judean Mtns

138

Telem

241

117

Secular

1982

E

Har Hebron

West

139

Tene Omarim

658

272

Secular

1983

E

Har Hebron

South

140

Tomer

228

362

Secular

1978

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

141

Vered Jericho

221

274

Secular

1980

V

Megilot

Dead Sea

142

Yafit

124

352

Secular

1980

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

143

Yakir

1645

342

Religious

1981

W

Shomron

Western S.

144

Yitav

195

170

Secular

1970

V

Bik’at HaYarden

Jordan Valley

145

Yitzhar

1172

269

Religious

1983

E

Shomron

Nablus

146

Zofin

1484

219

Mixed

1989

W

Shomron

Kedumim

Table 15

List of settlements in the West Bank to be annexed by Israel

Israeli settlements

Name

Population 2012

Builtup area (Dunums)

Character

Est.

Fence [7]

Council

Subarea or bloc

Under Israeli Flag

Alfei Menashe

7574

1085

Secular

1983

w

Shomron

Western S. [8]

y

Alon Shvut

3066

643

Religious

1970

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Bat Ayin

1117

239

Religious

1989

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Beit Yatir (Mezadot Yehuda)

399

170

Religious

1983

w

Har Hebron

South

y

Beitar lllit

42,467

1773

Orthodox

1985

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion [9]

y

East Talpiot

13,984

1195

Secular

1967

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Efrat(a)

7812

1090

Religious

1980

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion [8]

y

El’azar

2302

256

Religious

1975

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Elkana

3860

758

Religious

1977

w

Shomron

Western S. [8]

y

Eshkolot

510

133

Secular

1982

w

Har Hebron

South

y

Etz Efraim

864

184

Mixed

1985

w

Shomron

Western S.

y

French Hill (Giv’at Shapira)

8660

2018

Secular

1969

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Gilo

29,559

2859

Secular

1973

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Giv’at Hamivtar

2944

  

1970

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Giv’at Ze’ev

13,466

1063

Secular

1983

w

Mateh Binyamin

[8] Giv’on

y

Giv’on Hadasha

1131

226

Secular

1980

w

Mateh Binyamin

Giv’on

y

Har Adar (Giv’at HaRadar)

3701

969

Secular

1986

w

Mateh Binyamin

[8] Giv’on

y

Har Homa, Givat Hamatos

9811

2523/310

Religious

1997

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Hashmonaim

2573

835

Religious-Orthodox

1985

w

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

y

Hinanit

945

280

Mixed

1981

w

Shomron

Rehan

y

Kfar Etzion

975

445

Religious

1967

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Lapid

2543

386

Secular

1996

w

Hevel Modi’in

Modi’in

y

Ma’ale Adumim

36,862

3589

Mixed

1975

w

Gush Etzion [9]

Adumim

y

Ma’alot Dafna

2720

380

Secular

1972

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Matitvahu

568

195

Religious

1981

w

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

y

Menora

2644

453

Secular

1998

w

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in

y

Migdal Oz

512

576

Religious

1977

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Modi’in lllit

55494

1606

Orthodox

1996

w

Mateh Binyamin

Modi’in [8]

y

Neve Daniel

2058

263

Religious

1982

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Neve Yaakov

19,703

1759

Secular

1972

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Oranit

7195

878

Mixed

1985

w

Shomron

Western S. [8]

y

Pisgat Ze’ev

44,512

5467

Secular

1985

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Ramat Eshkol

3573

682

Secular

1970

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Ramat Shlomo

14,554

741

Orthodox

1995

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Ramot Alon

41,410

2558

Orthodox

1974

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Rehan

174

90

Secular

1977

w

Shomron

Rehan

y

Rosh Tzurim

855

320

Religious

1969

w

Gush Etzion

Etzion

y

Sanhedria Murhevet

4094

378

 

1970

w

Jerusalem

East Jerusalem

y

Sal’it

542

256

Secular

1977

w

Shomron

Enav

y

Sha’are Tikva

5100

915

Mixed

1983

w

Shomron

Western S.

y

Shaked

724

206

Secular

1981

w

Shomron

Rehan

y

Shani

430

30

Secular

1989

w

Har Hebron

South

y

Zofin

1484

219

Mixed

1989

w

Shomron

Kedumim

y

Total (excl. East Jerusalem):

345,037

 

Total Dunums

     
   

74,681

     
  

West Bank Area

5,876,000

     
  

Annexed Area

182,156

3.1 %

    
  

Built up Area

38,168

0.650 %

    
  

Population

405,471

74.58 %

    
  

Relocated

138,195

25.42 %

    
Fig. 4

Settlements to be annexed by Israel in the West Bank

Fig. 5

Settlements to be annexed by Israel in East Jerusalem

Figure 6 contains the map of territories proposed by Israeli participants for land swap in exchange for the territories annexed in Table 15 and depicted in Figs. 4 and 5. The proposed land swap alternatives were evaluated in Table 16.
Fig. 6

Israeli territories proposed for land swap

Table 16

Land swap evaluation

Criteria:

Area (km2)

Natural resources

Goal: evaluation of land swap

Final scores

Size (0.02)

Location (0.28)

Infrastructure (0.05)

Natural resources (0.29)

Territorial contiguity (0.29)

Potential for development (0.06)

Alternatives:

         

Beit Shean Valley

18

Orchards greenhouses vegetables fisheries

0.6

0.79

0.86

0.79

0.9

0.95

0.83

Judea Plain

 

Agriculture pasture lands

0.8

0.79

0.56

0.56

0.79

0.82

0.71

 Northern Lakhish Region

37.3

        

 Southern Lakhish Region

16.2

        

 Northern Lahav Reserve

3.8

        

 Eastern Lahav Reserve

6.1

        

 Northern Negev

  

0.6

0.5

0.21

0.38

0.5

0.44

0.45

 Arad Valley

93.5

Forestry Agriculture Nature Reserve

       

 Yatir Mountains

26.9

Vineyards

       

 Gaza Envelop

67.7

Orchards greenhouses vegetables nature reserve

0.9

0.82

0.69

0.75

0.86

0.86

0.81

 Halutza Sands

178.1

Aquifer

0

0

0

0

0

0.06

0

Evaluation of the five locations for land swap in terms of their potential to fulfill the five criteria listed

Result

The total area to be annexed by Israel is 3.1 % of the West Bank or 182 km2. The corresponding land from the sites prioritized above is selected by using the quality points from the final scores as follows: Beit Shean Valley (18 km2), Gaza Envelop (67.7 km2), Judea Plain (63.4 km2) and Northern Negev (32.9 km2).

Principle 2 Israel must respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage between the two areas, and the Palestinian State must guarantee that any agreement reached with Israel will be accepted and supported by the majority of the Palestinian people both in Gaza and the West Bank.

The implementation of Principle 2 reflects the feeling of both parties that any peace agreement should be subject to a referendum in each society so that the will of the people of both communities becomes apparent. The consensus of the representatives from both sides was that a significant proportion of their respective populations desired peace, if given the opportunity on a plan their leaders approve. Further, the Israeli representatives agreed that there should be free passage between Gaza and the West Bank without any restrictions in moving from one area to the other. This meant that some sort of corridor over Israeli land would be required.

Principle 3 East Jerusalem is the capital of the Palestinian State. The parties will maintain the status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.

The participants agreed on the following principles for the historic area of Jerusalem.

Principles and special arrangements for the historic area of Jerusalem

  1. 1.
    The ‘Historic Area’ includes Mt. Zion, the Kidron Valley, the Jewish Cemetery in the Mt. of Olives, the City of King David and the Old City as shown in Fig. 7.
    Fig. 7

    Historic area of Jerusalem

     
  2. 2.

    This area will function in the model of “Open City”. Citizens of either party may not exit this area into the territory of the other party.

     
  3. 3.
    Upon the implementation of the principles, Palestine will assume sovereignty over the entire area, excluding the Jewish Quarter and Mount Zion (as in Fig. 8).
    Fig. 8

    The Holy Basin

     
  4. 4.

    Palestinians will have control over the Haram al-Sharif and Israelis will have control over the Wailing Wall (no one will have sovereignty over these sites).

     
  5. 5.

    The religious status quo and particularly the existing arrangements pertaining to the exercise of religious practices will remain.

     
  6. 6.
    The implementation of these principles will be carried out according to the following three stages. A detailed time table will be agreed upon by the parties:
    1. a.

      Redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces and Israeli population from the Palestinian areas.

       
    2. b.

      A multinational force will help assume responsibility in the territory pertaining to the Palestinians.

       
    3. c.

      The State of Palestine assumes full control over its part of the area.

       
     
In addition, to the agreed upon facts noted above, the participants developed a series of actions (concessions) for each side. Next, the concessions were prioritized with respect to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs. Tables 17 and 18 summarize the priorities assigned and represent the judgments of the participants using the ratings approach of the AHP.
Table 17

Summary of assigned priorities (Israeli perspective) for Principle 3

Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

Priorities

P1

P2

 

Accepting the global recognition of Jerusalem (in its new borders) as the capital of Israel

0.2812

0.6

0.688

 

Increasing international and regional support for Israel

0.1508

0.75

0.663

 

Transfer of full governmental and municipal responsibility for the Palestinian residents of Eastern Jerusalem, while sharing social costs

0.0587

0

0

 

Security

0.0481

0

0

 

Receiving international legitimization to the Jewish neighborhood in East Jerusalem

0.2189

0.625

0.575

 

Strengthen Israeli democracy

0.2423

0.438

0.055

 
  

0.5246

0.4324

 

Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

Priorities

I1

I2

I3

Hurting the feelings of the global Jewish people by conceding on the right of Jews to live everywhere in Jerusalem

0.2255

0.402

0.875

0.12

Increasing potential friction due to the dual management of the city, increasing inefficiencies

0.1582

0.173

0.967

0.12

Hindering the ability to effectively zone and plan super-infrastructure inside and around Jerusalem

0.0954

0.283

0.533

0.287

Loss of security control

0.4271

0.317

0.587

0.67

Loss of demographic control

0.0938

0.37

0.503

0.553

  

0.3152

0.6989

0.4115

Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

Priorities

I1

I2

I3

Fulfill our national aspiration and dignity

0.3699

0.503

0.667

0.637

Enforcing the Palestinian national identity

0.2964

0.587

0.367

0.587

Free worship of the three monotheistic religions

0.0562

0

0

0

Social benefit by preserving the social fabric

0.1266

0.387

0.07

0.203

Economic benefit by developing the tourism industry and other aspects of life in the city

0.1509

0.1

0.07

0.583

  

0.4241

0.3747

0.5232

Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

Priorities

P1

P2

 

Political costs by accepting compromise within the land swap approach on parts of the city where Israeli settlements exist

0.5905

0.883

0.367

 

Limiting the potential urban, economic and social development of the city arising from the existence of Israeli settlements interlocked within the Palestinian capital

0.4095

0.317

0.337

 
  

0.6513

0.3544

 

Palestinian actions

    

P1. Full Palestinian cooperation during transfer of power and beyond it

    

P2. Accepting international monitoring on the compliance of the transfer of power process

    
Table 18

Summary of Assigned Priorities (Palestinian Perspective) for Principle 3

Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

Priorities

I1

I2

I3

Fulfill our national aspiration and dignity

0.2989

1

1

1

Enforcing the Palestinian national identity

0.4114

1

1

1

Free worship of the three monotheistic religions

0.0901

1

0.9

1

Social benefit by preserving the social fabric

0.0679

0.9

0.9

0.9

Economic benefit by developing the tourism industry and other aspects of life in the city

0.1317

1

1

0.9

 

0.9932

0.9842

0.98

Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

Priorities

P1

P2

 

Political costs by accepting compromise within the land swap approach on parts of the city where Israeli settlements exist

0.125

0.5

0.5

 

Limiting the potential urban, economic and social development of the city arising from the existence of Israeli settlements interlocked within the Palestinian capital

0.875

1

0.5

 
 

0.9375

0.5

 

Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

Priorities

P1

P2

 

Accepting the global recognition of Jerusalem (in its new borders) as the Capital of Israel

0.5039

0.9

0.9

 

Increasing international and regional support for Israel

0.065

0.9

0.75

 

Transfer of full governmental and municipal responsibility for the Palestinian residents of Eastern Jerusalem, while sharing social costs

0.0352

0.9

0.9

 

Security

0.114

0.9

0.75

 

Receiving international legitimization to the Jewish neighborhood in East Jerusalem

0.2616

0.9

0.75

 

Strengthen Israeli democracy

0.0204

0.5

0.5

 
 

0.8919

0.8258

 

Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

Priorities

I1

I2

I3

Hurting the feelings of the global Jewish people by conceding on the right of Jews to live everywhere in Jerusalem

0.2561

0.9

0.9

0.5

Increasing potential friction due to the dual management of the city, increasing inefficiencies

0.2519

0.75

0.5

0.5

Hindering the ability to effectively zone and plan super-infrastructure inside and around Jerusalem

0.2046

0.75

0.75

0.75

Loss of security control

0.1642

0.25

0.25

0.5

Loss of demographic control

0.1233

0.01

0.01

0.01

  

0.6151

0.5521

0.4908

Israeli actions

    

I1. Rescind all legal and administrative measures and orders legislated by Israel since 1967

    

I2. Preserve and respect the status quo of the holy places in the city as decreed and accepted by the Ottomans and the international community in 1856.

    

I3. Demolish the separation wall around the city erected by Israel

    
The priorities of the concessions with respect to the benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs (see Table 19) are combined to produce the gain ratios used to make trade-offs among the concessions. In this principle a pair of concessions, considered as a bundle, is traded as shown below.
Table 19

Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs, and gain ratios for Principle 3

Concessions

Israelis’ costs

Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ benefits

Israelis’ total loss

Palestinians’ benefits

Palestinians’ perception of Israelis costs

Palestinians’ total gain

Israelis

 1

0.45099442

0.810588685

365,570.9737

1

1

1,000,000

 2

1

0.716169725

716,169.7248

0.990938381

0.89757763

889,444.1231

 3

0.588782372

1

588,782.3723

0.986709625

0.797919038

787,314.3947

Concessions

Palestinians’ costs

Palestinians’ perception of Israelis’ benefits

Palestinians’ total loss

Israelis’ benefits

Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ costs

Israelis’ total gain

Palestinians

 1

1

1

1,000,000

1

1

1,000,000

 2

0.533333333

0.925888553

493,807.228

0.824247045

0.544142484

448,507.8349

 

P1

P2

 

Concessions

Gain

 

Israeli ratios

 I1

2.735446936

1.226869383

Trade-off

 I2

1.396317054

0

Israeli

1, 2

2.735

 

 I3

1.698420413

0

Palestinian

1, 2

2.801

 
 

P1

P2

    

Palestinian ratios

      

 I1

1

2.025081739

    

 I2

0

1.801197052

    

 I3

0

1.594376003

    

Note that the Israeli bundle consisting of the pairs (I1, P1) and (I2, P2) yielding a gain of 2.735 is matched with the Palestinian bundle consisting of the pairs (I1, P1) and (I2, P2) yielding a gain of 2.801, which is within 2.5 % of each other, which is an acceptable ratio. Please note that the Israeli and Palestinian actions are listed in Tables 17 and 18, respectively

As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will be as follows:

Israeli actions

  • Rescind all legal and administrative measures and orders legislated by Israel since 1967.

  • Preserve and respect the status quo of the holy places in the city as decreed and accepted by the Ottomans and the international community in 1856.

Palestinian actions

  • Full Palestinian cooperation during transfer of power and beyond it.

  • Acceptance of international monitoring on the compliance of the transfer of power process.

Principle 4 Acknowledge Israel’s Existence as a Jewish State without jeopardizing the rights of its minority Israeli citizens.

This principle does not deny non-Jewish Israeli citizens the full rights of Israeli citizenship.

Principle 5 Evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Palestinian territories who are not included in the land swap (see Tables 20, 21 and 22).

Israeli perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Security benefits.

     
  2. 2.

    Social and economic benefits.

     
  3. 3.

    Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces.

     
  4. 4.

    Allow Israel to define its borders.

     
  5. 5.

    Increased international support.

     
  6. 6.

    Strengthen the democratic nature of the state of Israel.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Economic cost to relocate the settlers.

     
  2. 2.

    Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror.

     
  3. 3.

    Erosion of national ethos.

     
  4. 4.

    Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic character.

     

Palestinian actions

  1. 1.

    Allowing Israel to choose between incremental and rapid removal of settlers/settlements.

     
  2. 2.

    A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israel during the relocation process and maintain a restrained approach toward the actual relocation.

     
  3. 3.

    Acknowledging the value of infrastructure, residential and commercial buildings and facilities, after Israeli withdraw.

     

Palestinian perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Repossession of land and natural resources.

     
  2. 2.

    Eliminate the harassment by the settlers.

     
  3. 3.

    Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development.

     
  4. 4.

    Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers).

     
  5. 5.

    Psychological and social benefits.

     
  6. 6.

    Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation.

     
  2. 2.

    Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities.

     

Israeli Actions

  1. 1.

    Ensure that the infrastructure is preserved.

     
  2. 2.

    Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land.

     
  3. 3.
    Secure the evacuation process in regard to the Palestinian population.
    Table 20

    Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 5

    Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Security benefits

    0.0461

    0.825

    0.788

    0.725

    Social and Economic benefits

    0.109

    0.788

    0.275

    0.115

    Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces

    0.0585

    0.588

    0.825

    0.078

    Allow Israel to define its borders

    0.2023

    0.313

    0.4

    0.078

    Increased international support

    0.1837

    0.213

    0.788

    0.033

    Strengthen the democratic nature of the state of Israel

    0.4004

    0.563

    0.563

    0.01

     

    0.4858

    0.5653

    0.0762

    Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Economic cost to relocate the settlers

    0.1282

    0.563

    0.563

    0.275

    Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror

    0.5261

    0.5

    0.5

    0.75

    Erosion of national ethos

    0.1208

    0.788

    0.6

    0.4

    Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic character

    0.2248

    0.275

    0.5

    0.5

     

    0.4922

    0.5201

    0.5906

    Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Repossession of land and natural resources

    0.3167

    0.862

    0.725

    0.563

    Eliminate the harassment by the settlers

    0.0775

    0.75

    0.5

    0.888

    Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development

    0.15

    0.85

    0.725

    0.438

    Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers)

    0.1171

    0.463

    0.95

    0.863

    Psychological and social benefits

    0.0909

    0.625

    0.725

    0.825

    Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity

    0.2478

    0.175

    0.01

    0.055

     

    0.6131

    0.5567

    0.5021

    Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation

    0.5074

    0.193

    0.825

    0.115

    Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities

    0.4926

    0.3

    0.788

    0.4

      

    0.2455

    0.8065

    0.2554

    Palestinian actions

    P1. Allowing Israeli to choose between incremental and rapid removal of settlers/settlements

        

    P2. A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israeli during the relocation process and maintaining a restrained approach toward the actual relocation

        

    P3. Acknowledging the value of infrastructure, residential and commercial buildings and facilities, after Israeli withdrawal

        
    Table 21

    Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 5

    Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Repossession of land and natural resources

    0.4034

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    Eliminate the harassment by the settlers

    0.0552

    0

    0

    0

    Ability to develop the Palestinian agriculture and urban development

    0.0967

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    Security (feel more secure in the absence of settlers)

    0.1647

    0.75

    0.75

    0.9

    Psychological and social benefits

    0.0196

    0

    0

    0

    Ensuring geographic and integral contiguity

    0.2604

    0.9

    0.9

    0.75

     

    0.808

    0.808

    0.7936

    Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Repair the damage caused by the settlers during evacuation

    0.5

    1

    0.5

    0.9

    Rehabilitation of the land and the facilities

    0.5

    1

    0.75

    0.75

     

    1

    0.625

    0.825

    Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Security benefits

    0.5537

    0.5

    0.75

    0.9

    Social and economic benefits

    0.1119

    0.75

    0.75

    0.75

    Increase in the effectiveness of military and police forces

    0.0553

    0

    0

    0

    Allow Israel to define its borders

    0.2534

    0.5

    0.01

    0.01

    Increased international support

    0.0258

    0

    0

    0

     

    0.4874

    0.5017

    0.5848

    Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Economic cost to relocate the settlers

    0.6505

    0.75

    0.5

    0.75

    Rift in the Israeli society, danger of civil war/Jewish terror

    0.1557

    0.75

    0.75

    0.75

    Erosion of national ethos

    0.0468

    0.25

    0.25

    0.25

    Puts a large strain on the Israeli democratic process

    0.147

    0.01

    0.01

    0.01

     

    0.6178

    0.4552

    0.6178

    Israeli actions

    I1. Ensure that the infrastructure is preserved

        

    I2. Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land

        

    I3. Secure the evacuation process in regard to the Palestinian population

        
    Table 22

    Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs, and gain ratios for Principle 5

    Concessions

    Israelis’ costs

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ benefits

    Israelis’ total loss

    Palestinians’ benefits

    Palestinians’ Perception of Israelis costs

    Palestinians’ total gain

     

    Israelis

     1

    0.833389773

    1

    833,389.7731

    1

    1

    1,000,000

     

     2

    0.880629868

    0.908008481

    799,619.3891

    1

    0.736808028

    736,808.0285

     

     3

    1

    0.818952863

    818,952.8625

    0.982178218

    1

    982,178.2178

     

    Concessions

    Palestinians’ costs

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis’ benefits

    Palestinians’ total loss

    Israelis’ benefits

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ costs

    Israelis’ total gain

     

    Palestinians

     1

    1

    0.833447332

    833,447.3324

    0.859366708

    0.304401736

    261,592.7177

     

     2

    0.625

    0.857900137

    536,187.5855

    1

    1

    1,000,000

     

     3

    0.825

    1

    825,000

    0.134795684

    0.316676999

    42,686.69265

     

    Israeli ratios

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Trade-off

       

     I1

    0

    1.199918732

    0

     

    Action

    Gain

     

     I2

    0

    1.250594988

    0

    Israeli

    I2

    1.250595

     

     I3

    0

    1.2210715

    0

    Palestinian

    P2

    1.374161

     

    Palestinian ratios

    P1

    P2

    P3

        

     I1

    1.199835864

    1.865018936

    1.212121212

        

     I2

    0

    1.374160925

    0

        

     I3

    1.17845265

    1.831780974

    1.190519052

        
     

As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will be as follows:

Israeli actions

  • I2. Facilitate the evacuation without causing any damage to the properties or land.

Palestinian actions

  • P2. A Palestinian commitment to fully collaborate with Israel during the relocation process and maintaining a restrained approach toward the actual relocation.

Principle 6 Palestinian full control of the borders of the Palestinian State and its outlets, and deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring system in the Jordan Valley (see Tables 23, 24 and 25).

Israeli perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Economic gains from relinquishing control of the borders (typically realized in term of operational costs) (see Tables 23, 24 and 25).

     
  2. 2.
    International benefits.
    1. a.

      Improved international relationship.

       
    2. b.

      Removal of sanctions.

       
     
  3. 3.

    Removal of sanctions.

     
  4. 4.

    Tourism.

     
  5. 5.

    Trade.

     
  6. 6.

    Increased security cooperation.

     
Costs
  1. 1.
    Security threat.
    1. a.

      Palestine itself.

       
    2. b.

      Internal actors such as Hamas.

       
    3. c.

      Non-state actors.

       
    4. d.

      Third party actors.

       
     
  2. 2.

    Loss of control.

     
  3. 3.

    Movement.

     
  4. 4.

    Maintenance of borders.

     
  5. 5.

    Cooperation costs.

     
  6. 6.

    Political.

     

Palestinian actions

  1. 1.

    Palestinian control over customs.

     
  2. 2.

    Limited arms—Principle 8.

     
  3. 3.

    Multi-national oversight—Principle 9.

     
  4. 4.

    Access to airspace for training.

     
  5. 5.

    Maintain borders with other countries.

     

Palestinian perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Economic gains internally and from controlling the borders: customs, relationships with neighboring countries.

     
  2. 2.

    International benefits: Open and establish international relationships and cooperation with the world.

     
  3. 3.

    Creating a new positive climate for better relations and cooperation between the two parties.

     
  4. 4.

    Free movement of people and goods.

     
  5. 5.

    Development of tourism industry.

     
  6. 6.

    Trade: controlling import and export on the basis of mutual benefits.

     
  7. 7.

    Political stability.

     
  8. 8.

    Encouraging international investment.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Running the border stations.

     
  2. 2.

    Manpower.

     
  3. 3.

    Political costs of engaging in early stages of the new situation with the Israelis.

     

Israeli actions

  1. 1.

    Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories.

     
  2. 2.

    Hand over fully the control point, border stations.

     
  3. 3.

    Provide Palestinians with all the information about the borders and passages.

     
  4. 4.

    Ensure no intervention what so ever in the border control points—respect the independence and integrity of the Palestinian borders.

     
  5. 5.
    Any information or requests passed through official channels on Palestinian side.
    Table 23

    Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 6

    Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    Economic gains from relinquishing control

    0.1275

    0.42

    0.6

    0.53

    0.01

    0.32

    Improved international relationships

    0.302

    0.65

    0.57

    0.6

    0.028

    0.81

    Removal of sanctions

    0.0669

    0.73

    0.29

    0.47

    0.01

    0.73

    Tourism

    0.1499

    0.402

    0.242

    0.47

    0.01

    0.63

    Trade

    0.1591

    0.55

    0.01

    0.112

    0.01

    0.27

    Increased security cooperation

    0.1946

    0.55

    0.98

    0.87

    0.47

    0.55

     

    0.5535

    0.4966

    0.5378

    0.105

    0.5787

    Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    Security threat

    0.5116

    0.84

    0.5

    0.222

    0.6

    0.082

    Loss of control

    0.3104

    0.81

    0.75

    0.22

    0.7

    0.16

    Maintenance of borders

    0.0922

    0.56

    0.45

    0.18

    0.55

    0.1

    Cooperation costs

    0.0858

    0.58

    0.86

    0.71

    0.58

    0.53

     

    0.7826

    0.6039

    0.2594

    0.6247

    0.1463

    Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    Economic gains internally and from controlling the borders: FDI, customs, relationships with neighboring countries

    0.1667

    0.65

    0.4

    0.19

    0.5

    0.24

    International benefits: open and establish international relationships and cooperation with the World

    0.1424

    0.81

    0.55

    0.32

    0.24

    0.16

    Creating a new positive climate for better relations and cooperation between the two parties

    0.2328

    1

    0.73

    0.65

    0.89

    0.9

    Free movement of people and goods

    0.2464

    1

    0.96

    0.45

    0.222

    0.472

    Development of tourism industry

    0.0799

    0.4

    0.81

    0.32

    0.29

    0.224

    Political stability

    0.1318

    0.93

    0.6

    0.16

    0.65

    0.046

     

    0.8574

    0.6953

    0.3861

    0.4883

    0.4126

    Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    Running the border stations

    0.5547

    0.55

    0.55

    0.84

    0.082

    0.89

    Political Costs of engaging in early stages of the new situation with the Israelis

    0.4453

    0.272

    0.7

    0.45

    0.84

    0.29

     

    0.4262

    0.6168

    0.6663

    0.4195

    0.6228

    Palestinian actions

          

    P1. Palestinian control over customs

          

    P2. Limited Arms: Principle 8

          

    P3. Multi-national oversight: Principle 9

          

    P4. Access to airspace for training

          

    P5. Maintain borders with other countries

          
    Table 24

    Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 6

    Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    Economic gains internally and from controlling the borders: customs, relationships with neighboring countries

    0.3076

    1

    1

    0.91

    0.98

    0.87

    International benefits: Open and establish international relationships and cooperation with the world

    0.0875

    1

    1

    0.9

    0.98

    0.84

    Creating a new positive climate for better relations and cooperation between the two parties

    0.0403

    0.94

    0.98

    0.9

    0.98

    0.86

    Free movement of people and goods

    0.2912

    0.98

    0.98

    0.37

    0.82

    0.16

    Development of tourism industry

    0.0484

    0.94

    0.84

    0.6

    0.83

    0.4

    Trade: Controlling import and export on the basis of mutual benefits

    0.0817

    1

    0.92

    0.81

    0.79

    0.45

    Political stability

    0.119

    1

    0.93

    0.71

    0.91

    0.84

    Encouraging international investment

    0.0243

    0.95

    0.88

    0.76

    0.78

    0.66

          

    0.5945

     

    0.9876

    0.9679

    0.7009

    0.8974

    Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    Running the border stations

    0.5516

    0.87

    0.84

    0.7

    0.95

    0.81

    Manpower

    0.2858

    0.76

    0.66

    0.65

    0.95

    0.76

    Political costs of engaging in early stages of the new situation with the Israelis

    0.1627

    0.35

    0.76

    0.73

    0.88

    0.73

          

    0.7827

     

    0.754

    0.7755

    0.6906

    0.9386

    Palestinian perceptions of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    Economic gains from relinquishing control

    0.2237

    1

    0.9

    0.25

    0.75

    0.25

    Improved international relationships

    0.1759

    0.75

    0.9

    0.9

    0.5

    0.9

    Removal of sanctions

    0.0107

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Movement

    0.0241

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Tourism

    0.0542

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Trade

    0.1923

    0.1

    0.75

    0.75

    1

    0.1

    Cooperation

    0.0167

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Political

    0.3025

    0.1

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    0.1

          

    0.2637

     

    0.4051

    0.776

    0.6306

    0.7505

    Palestinian perceptions of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    Threat

    0.0254

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Loss of control

    0.2777

    0.25

    0.5

    0.5

    0.25

    0.25

    Movement

    0.0748

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Maintenance of borders

    0.4573

    1

    0.75

    0.75

    0.01

    0.5

    Cooperation costs

    0.0397

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    Political

    0.1251

    0.01

    0.1

    0.1

    0.25

    0.1

          

    0.3106

     

    0.5279

    0.4943

    0.4943

    0.1053

    Israeli actions

     

    I1. Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories

          

    I2. Hand over fully the control point, border stations

          

    I3. Provide Palestinians with all the information about the borders and passages

          

    I4. Ensure no intervention what so ever in the border control points: respect the independence and integrity of the Palestinian borders

          

    I5. Any information or requests passed through official channels on Palestinian side

          
    Table 25

    Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs, and Gain Ratios for Principle 6

    Concessions

    Israelis’ costs

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ benefits

    Israelis’ total loss

    Palestinians’ benefits

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis costs

    Palestinians’ total gain

    Israelis

     I1

    1

    1

    1,000,000

    1

    1

    1,000,000

     I2

    0.771658574

    0.810940051

    625,768.8436

    0.980052653

    0.936351582

    917,673.8517

     I3

    0.331459238

    0.450314906

    149,261.0356

    0.709700284

    0.936351582

    664,528.983

     I4

    0.798236647

    0.56951248

    454,605.7322

    0.908667477

    0.199469597

    181,251.5349

     I5

    0.186940966

    0.4812223

    89,960.16162

    0.601964358

    0.588369009

    354,177.173

    Concessions

    Palestinians’ costs

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis’ benefits

    Palestinians’ total loss

    Israelis’ benefits

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ costs

    Israelis’ total gain

    Palestinians

     PI

    0.8033241

    0.522036082

    419,364.166

    0.956454121

    0.639651808

    611,797.6084

     P2

    0.826230556

    1

    826,230.5561

    0.858130292

    0.92570914

    794,379.0547

     P3

    0.735776689

    0.812628866

    597,913.3761

    0.929324348

    1

    929,324.3477

     P4

    1

    0.967139175

    967,139.1753

    0.181441161

    0.629596278

    114,234.6798

     P5

    0.833901556

    0.339819588

    283,376.0827

    1

    0.934714093

    934,714.0928

    Israeli ratios

    PI

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

     

     I1

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

     

     I2

    0

    1.26944488

    1.485092071

    0

    1.493705068

     

     I3

    4.098843384

    5.32207921

    6.226168428

    0

    6.262277953

     

     I4

    1.345776274

    1.747402196

    2.044242476

    0

    2.056098343

     

     15

    6.800761553

    8.83034268

    10.33039882

    1.269836311

    10.3903114

     

    Palestinian ratios

    PI

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

     

     I1

    2.384562347

    1.210315925

    1.672483072

    1.033977348

    3.528879327

     

     I2

    2.188250514

    1.110675277

    1.534793982

    0

    3.238360284

     

     I3

    1.584610792

    0

    1.111413475

    0

    2.34504259

     

     I4

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

     

     I5

    0

    0

    0

    0

    1.249848504

     
     

    Action

    Gain

        

    Trade-off

          

     Israeli

    12

    1.485092071

        

     Palestinian

    P3

    1.534793982

        

     Israeli

    15

    1.269836311

        

     Palestinian

    P4

    0

        

     Israeli

    11

    0

        

     Palestinian

    P2

    1.210315925

        
     
As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will be as follows:

Israeli actions

Gain

Palestinian actions

Gain

I2. Hand over fully the control point, border stations

1.4851

P3. Multi-national oversight: Principle 9

1.5348

I1. Total withdrawal from Palestinian territories

I5. Any information or requests passed through official channels on Palestinian side

1.2698

P2. Limited Arms: Principle 8

P4. Access to airspace for training

1.2103

Principle 7 Solve the Palestinian refugee problem in a just and agreed upon manner (see Tables 26, 27, 28 and 29).

Israeli perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Preservation of the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel.

     
  2. 2.

    Compensation for Jews from Arab lands/recognition as refugees (in accordance with Israeli law requiring this issue be raised in context of I-P negotiations).

     
  3. 3.

    Starting reconciliation process with the Palestinian people.

     
  4. 4.

    International recognition of the finality of the refugee problems.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Destroying the Jewish democratic nature of the State of Israel.

     
  2. 2.

    Destruction of towns and villages of Israel and resettlement of millions of Israelis.

     
  3. 3.

    Creating new imminent friction between Israelis and Palestinians.

     
  4. 4.

    Political.

     
  5. 5.

    To remain open to Palestinian claims.

     
  6. 6.

    Israel taking responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee issue will leave Israel solely responsible for solving the refugee issue financially and morally.

     

Palestinian actions

  1. 1.

    Recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.

     
  2. 2.

    Acknowledging the right of Palestinian refugees to return exclusively to the State of Palestine.

     
  3. 3.

    Resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue will settle all claims, collective and individual, of the Palestinian refugees.

     
  4. 4.

    The State of Israel has the exclusive right to decide who returns or immigrates to the State of Israel.

     
  5. 5.

    Claims for compensation of Palestinian refugees will be exclusively resolved by an agreed upon international mechanism with the participation and contribution of Israel.

     
  6. 6.

    Israel’s contribution as defined by the agreement between the parties will be the total and final compensation to all claims.

     
  7. 7.

    Within 5 years of the establishment of the international mechanism, UNRWA will dissolve and refugee status will be formally annulled.

     
  8. 8.

    Palestinians will commit to a reconciliation process, conducted by a joint committee.

     
  9. 9.

    Jewish refugees shall be compensated.

     
  10. 10.

    This agreement provides for the permanent and complete resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue.

     

Palestinian perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Israeli acknowledgement of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem.

     
  2. 2.

    End of suffering of the Palestinian people.

     
  3. 3.

    End of conflict.

     
  4. 4.

    Protecting, maintaining and enhancing the Palestinian social fabric.

     
  5. 5.

    Returning Palestinian control over their destiny.

     
  6. 6.

    Enabling the Palestinian people to have its share of regional development projects.

     
  7. 7.

    Rehabilitating and integrating the refugees into the Palestinian society and elsewhere.

     
  8. 8.

    Peace and stability in the region.

     
  9. 9.

    Contributing to the welfare of the host countries.

     
  10. 10.

    Create a climate of mutual cooperation and normalization with Israel.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Failure to resolve the refugee problem.

     
  2. 2.

    Undermining any other option for resolving the refugee problem.

     
  3. 3.

    Palestinian refugees considered as immigrants to Israel and not as people who have the right of return.

     
  4. 4.

    Denial of the Palestinian right to participate in the decision making for resolving the refugee problem.

     
  5. 5.

    Dissolving UNRWA before the final resolution of the refugee problem and ending the status of the refugees as refugees.

     
  6. 6.

    Exacerbation of the suffering of the refugees as a result of dissolving UNRWA before the final settlement of the claims.

     
  7. 7.

    Potential for not implementing the agreement.

     

Israeli actions

  1. 1.

    Right to choose to return to their original home.

     
  2. 2.

    Right to choose to resettle in the State of Palestine, the host countries or third countries.

     
  3. 3.

    Endorsement of the international community.

     
  4. 4.

    Endorsement of the Palestinian refugees comprehensive and individual justice.

     
  5. 5.

    International commission to develop opportunities for the refugees.

     
  6. 6.
    International commission to adjudicate property claims.
    Table 26

    Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 7

    Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Preservation of the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel

    0.6723

    0.788

    1

    1

    1

    0.113

    0.575

    0.538

    0.525

    0.363

    0.975

    Compensation for Jews from Arab lands/recognition as refugees

    0.0494

    0.088

    0.112

    0.438

    0.025

    0.463

    0.275

    0.213

    0.3

    1

    0.175

    Starting reconciliation process with the Palestinian people

    0.0853

    0.625

    0.313

    0.763

    0.538

    0.663

    0.563

    0.862

    1

    0.862

    0.862

    International recognition of the finality of the refugee problems

    0.1929

    0.5

    0.925

    0.975

    0.763

    0.888

    0.9

    0.975

    0.888

    0.6

    0.925

      

    0.6836

    0.883

    0.9471

    0.8665

    0.3263

    0.6218

    0.6336

    0.6244

    0.4825

    0.9162

    Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    I6

        

    Destroying the Jewish democratic nature of the State of Israel

    0.3833

    1

    0.112

    0

    0.8

    0.075

    0.275

        

    Destruction of towns and villages of Israel and resettlement of millions of Israelis

    0.3289

    0.975

    0.025

    0.088

    0.913

    0.088

    0.213

        

    Creating new imminent friction between Israelis and Palestinians

    0.0631

    0.975

    0.075

    0.188

    0.538

    0.112

    0.313

        

    Political

    0.037

    0.925

    0.112

    0.112

    0.925

    0.15

    0.088

        

    To remain open to Palestinian claims

    0.1 1 79

    0.338

    0.625

    0.5

    0.888

    0.075

    0.25

        

    Israel taking responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee issue

    0.0698

    0.925

    0.625

    0.215

    0.763

    0.153

    0.34

        
      

    0.9041

    0.1776

    0.1187

    0.8328

    0.0897

    0.2515

        

    Israeli perceived Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    I6

        

    Israeli acknowledgement of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem

    0.1499

    0.95

    0.463

    0.025

    0.888

    0.112

    0.438

        

    End of suffering of the Palestinian people

    0.2003

    0.925

    0.763

    0.5

    0.625

    0.8

    0.862

        

    End of conflict

    0.066

    0.9

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Protecting, maintaining and enhancing the Palestinian social fabric

    0.0803

    0

    0.563

    0.663

    0.763

    0.788

    0.4

        

    Retaining Palestinian control over their destiny

    0.1627

    0.463

    0.6

    0.663

    0.888

    0.688

    0.5

        

    Enabling the Palestinian people to have its share of regional development projects

    0.0476

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Rehabilitating and integrating the refugees into the Palestinian society and elsewhere

    0.1439

    0.275

    0.9

    0.7

    0.8

    0.9

    0.788

        

    Peace and stability in the region

    0.0446

    0.663

    0.663

    0.825

    0.7

    0.825

    0.663

        

    Contributing to the welfare of the host countries

    0.0283

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Create a climate of mutual cooperation and normalization with Israel

    0.0764

    0.4

    0.8

    0.75

    0.7

    0.825

    0.538

        
      

    0.562

    0.585

    0.4597

    0.6636

    0.5815

    0.5357

        

    Israeli Perceived Palestinian costs from Palestinian Concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Failure to resolve the refugee problem

    0.287

    0.8

    0.425

    0.15

    0.862

    0.625

    0.625

    0.725

    0.25

    0.313

    0.763

    Undermining any other option for resolving the refugee problem

    0.1173

    0.862

    0.95

    0.075

    0.1

    0.025

    0.338

    0.4

    0.025

    0.125

    0.5

    Palestinian refugees considered as immigrants to Israel and not as people who have the right of return

    0.0315

    0.825

    0.725

    0.1

    0.088

    0.05

    0

    0.088

    0.05

    0.025

    0.338

    Denial of the Palestinian right to participate in the decision making for resolving the refugee problem

    0.1092

    0.825

    0.85

    0.563

    0.9

    0.238

    0.275

    0.275

    0.05

    0

    0.075

    Dissolving UNRWA before the final resolution of the refugee problem and ending the status of the refugees as refugees

    0.0634

    0.195

    0.09

    0.1

    0.37

    0.375

    0.115

    0.225

    0.255

    0

    0.05

    Exacerbation of the suffering of the refugees as a result of dissolving UNRWA before the final settlement of the claims

    0.0668

    0.065

    0.5

    0.05

    0.338

    0.24

    0.155

    0.625

    0.05

    0

    0.025

    Potential for not implementing the agreement

    0.3248

    0.9

    0.862

    0.028

    0.378

    0.277

    0.215

    0.215

    0.125

    0.313

    0.528

      

    0.7559

    0.6683

    0.1351

    0.5289

    0.3398

    0.3365

    0.4136

    0.1418

    0.2066

    0.4725

    Table 27

    Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 7

    Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    I6

        

    Israeli acknowledgement of its responsibility for the Palestinian refugee problem

    0.3099

    0.663

    0.438

    0.338

    0.75

    0.725

    0.925

        

    End of suffering of the Palestinian people

    0.1067

    0.725

    0.788

    0.725

    0.9

    0.862

    0.862

        

    End of conflict

    0.0396

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Protecting, maintaining and enhancing the Palestinian social fabric

    0.0909

    0.7

    0.725

    0.688

    0.788

    0.663

    0.862

        

    Retaining Palestinian control over their destiny

    0.2104

    0.563

    0.725

    0.788

    0.688

    0.5

    0.725

        

    Enabling the Palestinian people to have its share of regional development projects

    0.0312

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Rehabilitating and integrating the refugees into the Palestinian society and elsewhere

    0.1134

    0.438

    0.788

    0.825

    0.763

    0.888

    0.913

        

    Peace and stability in the region

    0.0511

    0.725

    0.788

    0.888

    0.825

    0.888

    0.862

        

    Contributing to the welfare of the host countries

    0.0133

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Create a climate of mutual cooperation and normalization with Israel

    0.0336

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        
     

    0.5513

    0.5675

    0.549

    0.6733

    0.6281

    0.7571

        

    Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Failure to resolve the refugee problem

    0.0788

    1

    1

    0

    1

    0

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    1

    0

    Undermining any other option for resolving the refugee problem

    0.3502

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    1

    0.75

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    0

    0.9

    Palestinian refugees considered as immigrants to Israel and not as people who have the right of return

    0.1763

    1

    1

    1

    1

    0.9

    1

    1

    1

    1

    0.9

    Denial of the Palestinian right to participate in the decision making for resolving the refugee problem

    0.3072

    1

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    0.75

    1

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    Dissolving UNRWA before the final resolution of the refugee problem and ending the status of the refugees as refugees

    0.0281

    1

    0.75

    0.75

    1

    0.75

    0.75

    0.9

    0.75

    1

    0.9

    Exacerbation of the suffering of the refugees as a result of dissolving UNRWA before the final settlement of the claims

    0.0449

    1

    1

    0.9

    1

    0.75

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    0.75

    Potential for not implementing the agreement

    0.0144

    1

    1

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    1

    0.9

     

    0.965

    0.9623

    0.843

    1

    0.7656

    0.8673

    1

    0.92

    1

    0.82

    Palestinian perceived Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Preservation of the Jewish and democratic nature of Israel

    0.6802

    0.1

    1

    0.75

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    1

    0.9

    0

    1

    Compensation for Jews from Arab lands/recognition as refugee

    0.0322

    0

    0.25

    0.25

    0.1

    0.1

    0.1

    0

    0.9

    0

    0

    Starting reconciliation process with the Palestinian people

    0.0925

    0.25

    0.5

    0.5

    0.5

    0.75

    0.75

    0.1

    0.5

    0

    0.75

    International recognition of the finality of the refugee problem

    0.1951

    0.25

    0.25

    0.75

    0.75

    0.9

    0.9

    0.5

    0.9

    0

    0.75

     

    0.1399

    0.7832

    0.711

    0.808

    0.8603

    0.8603

    0.8

    0.86

    0

    0.9

    Palestinian perceived Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    I4

    I5

    I6

        

    Destroying the Jewish character of the State of Israel

    0.3498

    0.75

    0.25

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Destruction of towns and villages of Israel and resettlement of millions of Israelis

    0.0324

    0.75

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

        

    Creating new imminent friction between Israelis and Palestinians

    0.0446

    0.75

    0.1

    0

    0.1

    0

    0

        

    Political

    0.1433

    0.9

    0.1

    0.1

    0.5

    0.25

    0.75

        

    To remain open to Palestinian claims

    0.2069

    0.9

    0.5

    0

    0.25

    0.75

    0.1

        

    Israel taking responsibility for the creation of the Palestinian refugee issue

    0.2229

    0.9

    0

    0.5

    0.75

    0.25

    0.1

        
     

    0.836

    0.2097

    0.126

    0.295

    0.2467

    0.1505

        
    Table 28

    Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs for Principle 7

    Concessions

    Israelis’ costs

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ benefits

    Israelis’ total loss

    Palestinians’ benefits

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis costs

    Palestinians’ total gain

    Israelis

     I1

    1

    0.84689572

    846,895.7203

    0.728173293

    1

    728,173.2928

     I2

    0.196438447

    0.881555154

    173,171.3254

    0.74957073

    0.250837321

    188,020.3136

     I3

    0.131290786

    0.692736588

    90,949.93146

    0.725135385

    0.150478469

    109,117.2625

     I4

    0.921137042

    1

    921,137.0424

    0.889314489

    0.352870813

    313,813.1273

     I5

    0.099214689

    0.876280892

    86,939.93587

    0.829612997

    0.295095694

    244,815.2229

     I6

    0.278177193

    0.807263412

    224,562.2697

    1

    0.180023923

    180,023.9234

    Concessions

    Palestinians’ costs

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis’ benefits

    Palestinians’ total loss

    Israelis’ benefits

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ costs

    Israelis’ total gain

    Palestinians

     PI

    0.965

    0.156155821

    150,690.3672

    0.721782283

    1

    721,782.2828

     P2

    0.9623

    0.87420471

    841,247.1928

    0.932319713

    0.884111655

    824,274.7243

     P3

    0.8425

    0.79339212

    668,432.8608

    1

    0.178727345

    178,727.3449

     P4

    1

    0.901886371

    901,886.3712

    0.91489811

    0.699695727

    640,150.2982

     P5

    0.7656

    0.960263422

    735,177.6761

    0.344525393

    0.449530361

    154,874.6245

     P6

    0.8673

    0.960263422

    832,836.4661

    0.656530461

    0.445164704

    292,264.1887

     P7

    0.9848

    0.878446255

    865,093.8721

    0.668989547

    0.547162323

    366,045.8747

     P8

    0.9213

    0.963277151

    887,467.2396

    0.659275684

    0.187590951

    123,674.1526

     P9

    0.6498

    0.130371693

    84715.52629

    0.5094499

    0.273316576

    139,241.1024

     P10

    0.8223

    1

    822300

    0.967374089

    0.625082683

    604,688.7911

    Table 29

    Israeli, Palestinian gain ratios for Principle 7

    Israelis’ ratios

    Palestinian’s Concessions

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Israelis’ concessions

     I1

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

     I2

    4.168024

    4.75988

    1.032084

    3.69663

    0

    1.687717

    2.113779

    0

    0

    3.491853

     I3

    7.93604

    9.06295

    1.965118

    7.038491

    1.702856

    3.213462

    4.024697

    1.359805

    1.530964

    6.64859

     I4

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

     I5

    8.30208

    9.480968

    2.055757

    7.363133

    1.781398

    3.361679

    4.210331

    1.422524

    1.601578

    6.955248

     I6

    3.214174

    3.670584

    0

    2.850658

    0

    1.301484

    1.630042

    0

    0

    2.692744

    Palestinian’s ratios

    Palestinian’s concessions

    P1

    P2

    P3

    P4

    P5

    P6

    P7

    P8

    P9

    P10

    Israelis’ concessions

     I1

    4.832248

    0

    1.089374

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    8.595512

    0

     I2

    1.247726

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    2.219432

    0

     I3

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    1.288043

    0

     I4

    2.082503

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    3.704317

    0

     I5

    1.624624

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    2.889851

    0

     I6

    1.194661

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    0

    2.12504

    0

    Trade-off

    Action

    Gain

    Total

           

    Israeli

    II

    0

    10.2672

           

    Palestinian

    P9

    8.595512

    10.22014

           

    Israeli

    I3

    1.965118

            

    Palestinian

    P3

    0

            

    Israeli

    I5

    8.30208

            

    Palestinian

    PI

    1.624624

            
     

Matched concessions

Israeli actions

Gain

Palestinian actions

Gain

I1. Right to choose to return to their original home

0

P9. Jewish refugees shall be compensated

8.595

I3. Endorsement of the international community

1.965

P3. Resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue will settle all claims, collective and individual, of the Palestinian refugees

0

I5. International commission to develop opportunities for the refugees

8.302

P1. Recognition of Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish people

1.625

Total

10.27

 

10.22

Principles to solve the Palestinian refugee problem

  • The Palestinian refugees can choose to resettle in the State of Palestine, other host countries, or third party countries; those Palestinians who were originally displaced according to UNRWA’s registry from the area inside the Green Line and their spouse will be permitted to return to the State of Israel within 5 years. Palestinian refugees will be eligible for citizenship of the state they choose to resettle in or return to.

  • All refugees have the right to compensation for their suffering and loss of property. An agreed upon international commission will handle all claims and implementation.

While the participants spent considerable time in developing the principles noted above to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, it became clear that these principles were actually guidelines to approach that problem and did not represent a totally implementable program. Still ahead will be a series of meetings to address the following issues which, when resolved, would hopefully yield the details of a workable program. These issues would be addressed in the following order:
  1. 1.

    How can we satisfy the Palestinian narrative about the importance of the right of return? We have already completed some aspects of this question in our last meeting.

     
  2. 2.

    How do we get information from the refugees themselves about what their needs and preferences are? And how do we get in touch with refugees in camps and who would they have confidence in talking to?

     
  3. 3.

    How and where to resettle the refugees currently in camps and how can they be appropriately housed and given employment opportunities?

     
  4. 4.

    How can we compensate Palestinian refugees for the losses they have incurred, including who will be compensated, how much will they receive and where will the resources come from?

     

When this work is completed, the parties will have in hand a proposal for an approach, which is fair to both sides.

Principle 8 Limited Arms of the Palestinian state and international guarantees from the international community against aggression from other parties (see Tables 30, 31 and 32).

Israeli perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians.

     
  2. 2.

    No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military assistance.

     
  3. 3.

    Social psyche: without the threat of military presence the social psyche will be relieved (sense of security).

     
  4. 4.

    Using Palestinian airspace for military training.

     
  5. 5.

    Allows for finalization of the conflict.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Lack of control.

     
  2. 2.

    Threat.

     
  3. 3.

    Political.

     
  4. 4.

    Restructuring of how to ‘deal’ with the new status.

     

Palestinian actions

  1. 1.
    List of forbidden weapons.
    1. a.

      Strategic weapons.

       
    2. b.

      Tanks.

       
    3. c.

      Missiles/rocket.

       
    4. d.

      Aircraft.

       
     
  2. 2.

    Monitoring by private groups.

     
  3. 3.

    Multinational monitoring (Principle 9).

     

Palestinian perspective

Benefits
  1. 1.

    Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military expenditures.

     
  2. 2.

    Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine.

     
  3. 3.

    Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guarantees.

     
Costs
  1. 1.

    Threat.

     
  2. 2.

    Loss of control.

     
  3. 3.

    Redeployment and restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status.

     

Israeli actions

  1. 1.

    Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading air space.

     
  2. 2.

    Israel should abide by the international commitment to support principle 8.

     
  3. 3.
    Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading borders.
    Table 30

    Israeli benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 8

    Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians

    0.3278

    1

    0.975

    0.862

    No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military

    0.1883

    0.563

    0.525

    1

    Sense of security

    0.1726

    0.975

    1

    0.862

    Using Palestinian airspace for military training

    0.3113

    0.938

    0.033

    0.07

     

    0.8939

    0.6012

    0.6417

    Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Threat

    0.4448

    1

    0.01

    0.725

    Loss of control

    0.4757

    0.888

    0.375

    0.825

    Redeployment and restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status

    0.0795

    0.813

    0

    0

     

    0.9316

    0.1828

    0.715

    Israeli perception of Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military expenditures

    0.5978

    0.195

    0.01

    0.663

    Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine

    0.1127

    0.725

    0.925

    0.888

    Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guarantees

    0.2895

    0.318

    0.725

    0.862

     

    0.2902

    0.3201

    0.7458

    Israeli perception of Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Risk associated with limited national defense

    0.11

    0.725

    0.563

    0.1

    Political cost associated with the limitations of arms

    0.2364

    0.725

    0.5

    0.5

    Financial burden incurred by the international community and to be shared by the State of Palestine

    0.1688

    0.033

    0.502

    0.313

    National pride undermined by limited arms policy

    0.4849

    0.75

    0.1

    0.725

     

    0.6203

    0.3133

    0.5335

    Palestinian actions

        

    P1. List of forbidden weapons

        

     (a) Strategic Weapons

        

     (b) Tanks

        

     (c) Missiles/Rocket

        

     (d) Aircraft

        

    P2. Monitoring

        

     (a) Private groups

        

    P3. Multinational monitoring (Principle 9)

        
    Table 31

    Palestinian benefits, costs, perceived benefits and perceived costs for Principle 8

    Palestinian benefits from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Allocation of resources for economic development rather than military expenditures

    0.2176

    0.9

    0.9

    0.9

    Declare and ensure the neutrality of the State of Palestine

    0.0503

    1

    1

    0.9

    Ensure the security of the State of Palestine through international guarantees

    0.7322

    1

    1

    0.9

     

    0.9782

    0.9782

    0.9

    Palestinian costs from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Risk associated with limited national defense

    0.6668

    0.9

    0.5

    0.5

    Political cost associated with the limitations of arms

    0.2181

    0.75

    0.75

    0.75

    Financial burden incurred by the international community and to be shared by the State of Palestine

    0.0376

    0.25

    0.25

    0.25

    National pride undermined by limited arms policy

    0.0775

    0.75

    0.75

    0.75

     

    0.8312

    0.5645

    0.5645

    Palestinian perception of Israeli benefits from Palestinian concessions

    Priorities

    P1

    P2

    P3

    Reduction in threat from conventional military risk from Palestinians

    0.2389

    0.75

    0.75

    0.9

    No other country can support/aid Palestinians with military

    0.0478

    0

    0

    0

    Social psyche: without the threat of military presence the social psyche will be relieved

    0.1082

    1

    0.75

    0.9

    Using Palestinian airspace for military training

    0.0222

    0

    0

    0

    Allows for finalization of the conflict

    0.5828

    0.9

    0.75

    0.9

     

    0.8119

    0.6975

    0.837

    Palestinian perception of Israeli costs from Israeli concessions

    Priorities

    I1

    I2

    I3

    Threat

    0.0377

    0.25

    0.01

    0.01

    Loss of control

    0.0998

    0.01

    0.01

    0.01

    Restructuring how to ‘deal’ with the new status

    0.5986

    0.1

    0.01

    0.1

    Political

    0.2639

    0.5

    0.5

    0.25

     

    0.2023

    0.1393

    0.1272

    Israeli actions

        

    1. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading air space

        

    2. Israel should abide by the international commitment to support principle 8

        

    3. Israeli commitment not to violate the Palestinian sovereignty by invading borders

        
    Table 32

    Israeli, Palestinian benefits and costs, perceived benefits and costs, and gain ratios for Principle 8

    Concessions

    Israelis’ costs

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ benefits

    Israelis’ total loss

    Palestinians’ benefits

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis costs

    Palestinians’ total gain

    Israelis

     1

    1

    0.389112363

    389,112.3626

    1

    1

    1,000,000

     2

    0.196221554

    0.42920354

    84,218.9857

    1

    0.688581315

    688,581.3149

     3

    0.76749678

    1

    767,496.7797

    0.920057248

    0.628769155

    578,503.6181

    Concessions

    Palestinians’ costs

    Palestinians’ perception of Israelis’ benefits

    Palestinians’ total loss

    Israelis’ benefits

    Israelis’ perception of Palestinians’ costs

    Israelis’ total gain

    Palestinians

     1

    1

    0.970011947

    970,011.9474

    1

    1

    1,000,000

     2

    0.679138595

    0.833333333

    565,948.829

    0.672558452

    0.505078188

    339,694.6041

     3

    0.679138595

    1

    679,138.5948

    0.717865533

    0.860067709

    617,412.9645

    Israeli ratios

    P1

    P2

    P3

       

    I1

    2.569951757

    0

    1.586721533

       

    I2

    11.87380721

    4.033468241

    7.331042512

       

    I3

    1.302937063

    0

    0

       

    Palestinian ratios

    P1

    P2

    P3

       

    I1

    1.030915137

    1.766944198

    1.472453499

       

    I2

    0

    1.216684759

    1.013903966

       

    I3

    0

    1.022183612

    0

       

    Trade-off

    Action

    Gain

        

    Israeli

    I1

    1.586721533

        

    Palestinian

    P3

    1.472453499

        
     

As a result of these matched concessions the actions to be required of each party will be as follows:

Israeli actions
  • Israeli commitment not to violate the borders of the State of Palestine.

Palestinian actions
  • Multi-national oversight—Principle 9.

Principle 9 Agreed upon international monitoring mechanism and agreed upon binding international arbitration mechanisms.

What is needed for the implementation of this principle is:
  • Monitor and verify the implementation of the agreement.

  • Time table for the implementation of the agreement.

  • International arbitration mechanism to deal with any problems arising during implementation of agreements based on differences in interpretations.

Conclusions and recommendations

The outcomes noted previously represent a first step at producing a solution to the controversy, which can be used as a basis for further negotiation. With the exception of the refugee problem, it postulates what could be considered as a first draft for a proposal that would end hostilities. AHP has provided a solution which has drained much of the emotionality as it is possible in such circumstances. It has structured the problem much more efficiently than traditional face to face negotiations have been able to provide. At the same time, it has utilized a more refined measurement technique that makes it possible to compare the benefits and costs which each side sees as the result of the judgments they have made. When the total implementation of the refugee issue is completed, which may take another year, we will have produced, through AHP, an implementable proposal to begin a new era in the Middle East.

Over the last six decades, a veritable plethora of negotiators, presidents, foreign ministers, organizations like the United Nations, groups of allied countries, etc. have attempted to create peace in Israel and Palestine. However, no matter how worthy their intentions were, they have all failed. The basic premise of these negotiations has been that the way to a solution required an outside party to convince the principals to gather in the same room and begin negotiating. The outside parties then left the negotiators to attack one or more of the issues, together or separately, and find an acceptable outcome. While some progress was made using this approach, it was never an outcome which came even close to providing the necessary solution.

So what is it we have produced that will move the process ahead to a point beyond what had been achieved to date? The AHP solution will eventually provide a proposal, with many of the details in place. It will suggest exactly where the borders should be for each country. It will drive away most of the emotionality from the discussions. It will identify which settlements will remain in Israeli possession and which will need, to either be closed or the communities remain in place, but under Palestinian sovereignty. It will suggest exactly how much land now owned by the Palestinians, but in the future will be occupied by the Israelis, needs to be counterbalanced by giving Israeli land to the Palestinians. It will evaluate the land offered for such land swaps in a mode that will be satisfactory to the Palestinian side. It will identify East Jerusalem as the capital of the Palestinian State, but will maintain the status quo of the holy places in Jerusalem.

It will permit the Palestinians to acknowledge the existence of Israel as a Jewish State while guaranteeing the rights of its minority citizens. It will guarantee that Israel will respect the integrity of the West Bank and Gaza by allowing free and safe passage between the two areas. It will guarantee the evacuation of Israeli settlers from the Palestinian territories that are not included in the land swaps. It will guarantee that the Palestinians will be in full control of the Palestinian State border and its outlets. It will permit the deployment of a temporary agreed upon multinational military monitoring system in the Jordan Valley. It will limit the arms permitted to the Palestinian state and provide international guarantees against aggression from other parties. It will identify the process by which both communities will have access to the holy places.

Eventually it will outline a specific outcome whereby some Palestinian refugees have the option to return to live in Israel if they wish. It will also address the question of what compensation should be paid to which refugees and how they might be resettled in other countries or territories. This portion of the work remains to be completed.

One may ask whether this constitutes a complete solution to the problem at hand. The answer is an obvious no. Many details remain to be settled. Some disagreement among the official negotiators will inevitably require modification of parts of the outcomes noted above. There also is the question of whether a different set of participants expressing different judgments may reach different conclusions. While that may be true, the credibility of the current participants suggests that the outcomes might be quite similar. But even if that is not the case, we will produce, through AHP, an outcome that provides an implementable alternative solution. No matter how the outcomes are produced, what the actual negotiators will have in hand is an implementable or partially implementable proposal that has been provided by knowledgeable people on both sides and supported by a far more scientific approach, using quantitative and computer technology, than has ever been attempted before. It is far more likely that a group of negotiators reviewing a detailed, specific and implementable solution will be able to modify it towards a final agreement than if they were starting from scratch in trying to develop a solution without structural foundation and judgments which are unique to AHP. After 60 years of trying the parties might be well advised to think outside of the box and look at the picture with a different focus.

One may skeptically argue that even with such a cool-headed rational agreement between the two sides, negatives have so dominated the scene, since the beginning, that what one has done on paper will encounter such resistance that people would give up and the conflict would continue. Whatever solution is provided, it will inevitably require a vote by the populations of both sides. Even if the Gaza population would vote negative, on the recommendation of its Hamas constituency, the proposal might be approved by an overriding positive vote of its West Bank constituency. Similarly, certain groups within the Israeli side will likely vote negative. However, using democratic principles, the majority should prevail, even if the vote is close. Just how strong the residents of Israel and Palestine feel about the advantages of peace versus the current conflict will be recorded in the vote. If the vote is close, one or both sides will have an implementation problem that would certainly be difficult. If the popular vote is positive on one side and negative on the other, the negotiators will have to go back to work. But, at least, the populations will have had a chance to express their democratic position. Getting to that stage of the negotiations would be a step forward that might suggest sufficient momentum to adjust the proposal enough to engender majority support.

Thinking outside of the box is always painful and breeds uncertainty. An AHP-derived solution will certainly be a novel way of ending the controversy, but when all else has failed, summoning the courage to consider unique approaches may be what is called for in these dire circumstances.

Declarations

Authors’ contributions

TLS, LGV and HJZ contributed equally to this work. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Compliance with ethical guidelines

Competing interests The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Open AccessThis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

Authors’ Affiliations

(1)
University of Pittsburgh

References

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Copyright

© Saaty et al. 2015